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I
Of more than 6,000 titles listed in the standard guide to American
autobiography, fewer than 300 are credited to lawyers.' Clergymen
predominate; journalists and farmers outnumber representatives of
what Tocqueville and others following him have identified as the
aristocracy of the New World. This paucity of legal autobiography
-even more noticeable when one tries to enumerate only works of
intellectual merit-is all the more curious because autobiography ap-
pears to be a mode of expression especially congenial to Americans.
2
If "true autobiography" can only be generated by men and women
"pledged to something within,"3 it is not surprising that true auto-
biographers should abound in a society that has commonly been
thought to offer a minimum of institutions and traditions to divert
individuals from the path of self-discovery. Lawyers, however, have
been disinclined to travel that path.
Exceptions might be noted-John Adams, for example, or Clarence
Darrow,4 not to mention miscellaneous self-promoting courtroom
swashbucklers. But there is apparently an essential American conflict
between the legal mind and the autobiographical impulse. Such a
t Assistant Professor of History, Harvard University.
1. A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHIES (L. Kaplan ed. 1961).
2. See R. SAYRE, THE EXAMINED SELF: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, HENRY ADAMS, HENRY
JAMES 33-43 (1964) (general discussion of American autobiography).
3. R. PASCAL, DESIGN AND TRUTH IN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 195 (1960).
4. DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS (L. Butterfield ed. 1961); C. DARROW,
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conflict is indicated succinctly by a few remarks in one of the best
of American legal autobiographies, Frederic C. Howe's Confessions
of a Reformer. "For two years I worked listlessly at the law," Howe
recalled in 1925, "and played cards in the evenings. . . . I disliked
the law, had a fear of the judges, and most of all shrank from the
experienced practitioners with whom I felt I could never cope."r
Evidently, little more had to be said-which may be why some true
autobiographers who have happened to be lawyers have had so little
to say about law. Unfortunately, silence and reticence do not enhance
understanding. For anyone interested in the relationship between pro-
fessional legal culture and ecumenical American values, it is fortunate
that two important and revealing legal autobiographies have recent-
ly been published-The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans
Hughes and William 0. Douglas's Go East, Young Man: The Early
Years. Read in both biographical and historical context, these two
books allow us to enter the mainstream of modern American legal
culture-and to discern some countercurrents. Taken together, they
point to a gap separating 20th century professional values from in-
ward concerns traditional to American thought.
II
Though the lives interpreted in these two books contrast sharply
and significantly in some respects, it is striking to note the parallel
circumstances that eventually brought these two men together in
April 1939, when Douglas at the age of 40 joined a Supreme Court
presided over by Hughes, more than 35 years his senior. Both men
had been born into unprosperous but polite families; each was the
son of a Protestant clergyman. Hughes as a small child suffered an
"inflamation of the lungs" that for many years left him in delicate
health, subject to fatigue and attacks of nervous depression. Always
preoccupied with his health, he meticulously and proudly recorded
in the Notes his increase in weight from a feeble 127 pounds circa
1891 ("with my clothes on, excepting coat and vest") to a mature
173 pounds ("stripped, before breakfast") in later life.6 The key to
this improvement in his physical condition was a program of strenuous
walking that he initiated in the early 1890's while teaching at the
hilly Cornell campus. Later, after a month in Switzerland, he made
5. F. HOWE, THE CONFESSIONS OF A REFORMER 75 (1925).
6. C. HUGHES, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 12, 88 n.28,
114-15, 118 (D. Danelski & J. TuIchin eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HUGHES].
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a regular hobby of hiking in the mountains-an activity which was
also Douglas's way of overcoming both the physical and the emo-
tional "scars" and "worries" that had resulted from a severe case of
infantile paralysis. 7 (The recoveries of both children were due in
large measure to attentive nursing by devoted mothers.") Both at-
tended Columbia Law School, and both were successful afterwards
in part because they were endowed with "photographic minds" that
enabled them to complete laborious tasks rapidly.9 Hughes's public
career was founded in the first decade of the century on his ability
as a legislative counsel in New York State to probe the complexities
and chicaneries of public utility and insurance companies. Douglas
was first prominent when, as a Member and then Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission during the Depression, he es-
tablished a reputation for wizardry at understanding essentials in
the tangled world of high finance.' 0 As Justices both men were par-
ticular admirers of Brandeis, whose seat on the Court Douglas had
been selected to fill." Little wonder, then, that Douglas-whose father
had died at an early age-glimpsed something paternal in the dig-
nified mien of his Chief Justice.
12
But the parallels extend only so far, and are probably more mis-
leading than instructive. Hughes's life was not of the sort to furnish
material for an autobiography in the classic American mode. Doug-
las's life is, and he has written such an autobiography.
Hughes's Notes tell us much, sometimes inadvertently. They show
the singlemindedness of the man to whom Learned Hand attributed
"relentless self-discipline."' 3 Thoroughness was the virtue his mother
instilled in him, and these Notes were a final effort to tidy up, to
set the record straight.14 More or less they do that, with the help
of a fine job of informative but unoppressive editing by Danelski
and Tulchin, who draw on the relevant scholarly literature and on
the biographical memoranda prepared at Hughes's request by Henry
C. Beerits, a young graduate of Princeton. There are few unex-
pected specifics here, since the Notes in their original unpublished
7. Id. at 115; NV. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 32-34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
DOUGLAS].
8. DOUGLAS 32; HUGHES 12.
9. HUGHES 49-61, 337; DOUGLAS 127-56, xi.
10. HUGHES 119-27; DOUGLAS 257-96.
11. DOUGLAS 447-49. For Hughes's response to Brandeis, see Hughes, They Don't Make
Them Like That Any More, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 30, 1974, at 32.
12. HUGHES xx.
13. THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARED HAND 222 (I. Dillard ed.
1953).
14. HUGHES 2, 13-14.
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form were fully exploited by Merlo J. Pusey for his appreciative
two-volume biography, published in 1951.15 But overall, Hughes's
self-portrait makes an impression. As his grandson suggests, there
was "a certain conventionality" about Charles Evans Hughes's thought
and way of expressing himself; his conquest of "the Wasp establish-
ment" appears to have "taken a great deal out of him."' 6 Despite
the assurances of his editors that really he was a warm and humorous
man, the public image of cold, cerebral austerity seems to reflect
accurately the iron purposefulness and immunity to enthusiasm of
the man. Though a hiker in the mountains, he was of course "never
a mountaineer"; he just did "all that a sedentary man, with a young
family dependent upon him, should attempt."'17 Though eventually
he rebelled against the formal religion of his youth, he always re-
mained "careful not to give offense" to those who preferred the
old ways, his parents included. Never having experienced a call to
the ministry, he brought to the law-which originally struck him as
"repugnant"-an orderly sense of duty and a strong analytic mind?8
"I have never known a man," Associate Justice Owen Roberts re-
called after his death,
who patterned his life so meticulously and with such obvious in-
tellectual balance. He calculated with nicety how much of his
time he must devote to each of the departments of the Court's
work. He laid out his day, his week, and his month accordingly,
and he rigorously lived up to the schedule he had set himself.19
If it is useful to locate one autobiographical model for Hughes's
Notes, Franklin's-sui generis, from the 18th century-is the obvious
choice. More accurately, it is a particular interpretation of Franklin's
recollections-like Hughes's, not avowedly intended for publication
-that resonates in the Notes. Unkind as it may be to say so, one
cannot help seeing in Hughes something of "the pattern American"
that D. H. Lawrence saw in Franklin.20 It appears fitting, then, that
Hughes's Welsh father first determined to emigrate to America after
reading the Franklin autobiography, and that young Charles at the
15. M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951).
16. Hughes, supra note 11, at 32-33.
17. HUGHES 115. In any case, as his ever-patient wife discovered during their European
tour of 1905, even the most breathtaking mountains had to take second place to the
problems of handling an insurance investigation. Id. at 121.
18. Id. at 25, 49; 1 M. PUSEY, supra note 15, at 60.
19. PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR AND OFFICERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, Nov. 4, 1949, IN MEMORY OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 120 (1950).
20. D.H. LAWRENCE, STUDIES IN CLASSIC AMERICAN LITERATURE 19-31 (1955).
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age of six was so Franklinesque as to draw up the "Charles E. Hughes
Plan of Study," a self-imposed substitute for a regime of formal school-
ing. It is worth noting, too, that Hughes, like Franklin, found city
life "very agreeable." In one brief paragraph of the Notes describing
his first trip to the far West, Douglas's country, the only emotion
Hughes recorded was pessimism over the bleak economic prospects
of the region.2
1
Douglas, by contrast, celebrates an open, breezily energetic, indi-
vidual style of life, in himself and in others. "I believe in cultivating
one's own garden and not other people's," he once wrote to his friend
Jerome Frank. "What is good for you may be spinach to me or
vice versa. But what the hell? Because you like gin and bitters, is
there any reason why I should not get tight on long drinks of
Scotch and soda? Nuts!"'22 A communicant with nature, Douglas re-
cords his sensation of squalor upon reaching Chicago during the
long trek from his home in Yakima, Washington, to law school in
the nation's largest city. For New York he soon developed "a deep
dislike," preferring "God's own land" on the other edge of the con-
tinent.2 3 Invariably, Douglas rushes in where Hughes chose not to
venture. Fears are not just subjected to control; in episode after
episode (many of which appeared long ago in Of Men and Moun-
tains24) they are conquered through open confrontation with dan-
ger.25 Religion, it soon is evident, is "usually aligned with the Es-
tablishment." Divorce, which in the context of his Presbyterian heri-
tage once seemed sinful, loses its terror.
26
Go East, Young Man is suffused with youthful, humanistic spirit
and with commitment to the general purposes Douglas proclaimed
in his controversial Points of Rebellion, the book that in 1970 con-
tributed to the determination of Gerald Ford and 110 of his col-
leagues in the House to impeach the Justice. The goal of the re-
bellious young, Douglas wrote then, "is to make the existing system
more human, to make the machine subservient to man, to allow for
the flowering of a society where all the idiosyncrasies of man can
be honored and respected." 27 In Go East Douglas presents a life in-
21. HUGHES 4, 14, 37, 100.
22. DOUGLAS 425.
23. Id. at 132, 137.
24. W. DoUGLAS, OF MEN AND MOUNTAINS (1950).
25. DOUGLAS 183-202.
26. DOUGLAS 14, 144.
27. W. DOUGLAS, PoiNTS OF REBELLION 9 (1970). On the impeachment effort, see
Viorst, Bill Douglas Has Never Stopped Fighting the Bullies of Yakima, N.Y. Times,
June 14, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 8.
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creasingly in harmony with this point of view. He has been making
a journey toward self-discovery and self-fulfillment for many years.
Go East chronicles that journey through 1939. As befits an author
who once toyed with the possibility of making literature his career,
28
it is a book that brings to mind such earlier American autobiograph-
ical efforts as the maverick Theodore Parker's farewell letter to his
maverick Boston congregation, written on the eve of the Civil War,20
or Louis H. Sullivan's memoir of perpetual warfare with traditional-
ist architects at the end of the century,30 or even-to stretch mat-
ters a bit-Walden. It is a book that has a voice of its own. It speaks
with the inner conviction that marks a true autobiographer.
Because it is an autobiography in the classic American mode, Go
East does not tell us as much as we might like about Douglas's public
career, or about the institutions and events he has observed. Some
readers will be disappointed, for example, that he proposes no serious
structural explanations for what he concedes to have been the failure
of the experiments in legal education undertaken while he was at
Yale, early in the Depression. It all came to "zero," he merely says,
"because we could not find enough people who were willing to
devote effort to such matters."3 ' A man capable of illuminating com-
plex financial structures, Douglas could be far more insightful in
his discussion of the American law school, if he wished. Such is
plainly not his main concern.
Let it be clear too that Go East is firmly embedded in mainstream
American ideology, despite a certain flirtatious use of radical vo-
cabulary from the late 1960's. The Douglas family really was poor
after his father died, but it is more fashionable than precise of him
to say that his "little mother . . . knew poverty in the Middle
Eastern, African, and Latin-American sense of the word." Elsewhere
he notes that the Douglases "never felt underprivileged"; they were
entirely lacking, he says, in experience of class discrimination. 32 In
general, Go East is marred by a few too many faint glimpses of in-
justices that would not become fully apparent for many decades. What
these retrospective premonitions do is to obscure the fundamentally
familiar and comforting message of Douglas's life. His own brand of
28. DOUGLAS 119.
29. 2 J. WEIss, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE PARKER 447 (1864) (Appendix
II: Parker's "Letter to the Members of the Twenty-Eighth Congregational Society of
Boston").
30. L. SULLIVAN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA (1924).
31. DOUGLAS 170.
32. Id. at 8, 21.
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"radicalism," a word which for him covers a range from Jefferson
to Marx, is best not called "radicalism" at all. Despite occasional
hints of more daring intentions, Douglas is usually accurate in saying
that what he stood for during his days as a New Dealer was simply
a program to make capitalism honest again. A Joseph Kennedy pro-
teg6, he was out to use the SEC to regulate the financial community
in order to protect the rights and restore the confidence of small
investors. In contrast to the more comprehensive visions of planners
like Rexford Tugwell, his was a Brandeisian sense of America as
"a complex and diverse pluralistic society" in which there was "room
for everyone, even the brokers and dealers." Truly free enterprise,
he believed, "freed the spirits and loosed all men's creative energies."
33
Douglas mentions in passing that he was opposed upon occasion,
including that of his nomination to the Supreme Court, as being
too conservative in his thinking. But he declines to elaborate. 34 Con-
sidering his recent willingness to associate himself with fulminations
against all aspects of "the Establishment," we should be unsurprised
by his failure to report, for example, that news of his selection to
succeed Brandeis was favorably received on Wall Street.35 Nor does
he report the tone of his public addresses while on the SEC. Though
there were times when he antagonized the people he was regulating,
as in the notorious Bond Club speech of 1937, mostly he was un-
threatening. "We were and are in the same boat together," he told
a dinner crowd gathered to mark reorganization of the New York
Stock Exchange. "I do not relish governmental intrusion into your
business any more than you do." Finance, he observed elsewhere,
"occupies an important place in our society .... But finance moves
into the zone of exploitation whenever it becomes the master rather
than the faithful servant of investors and business." 32
Reasonable enough, perhaps-but not what some of Douglas's youth-
ful admirers of the last decade would like. Some of those admirers,
indeed, have been reading revisionist New Left commentaries on the
New Deal that pass severe judgment on its halfway measures.37 Proba-
33. Id. at 307, 356, 365, 380. See generally id. at 257-316; R. DEBEDTS, THE NEW
DEAL'S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS (1964); M. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE
NEW DEAL (1970).
34. DOUGLAS 286-87, 463.
35. See, e.g., NEwswEvEK, Mar. 27, 1939, at 13-14.
36. DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM
0. DOUGLAS 10, 83 (J. Allen ed. 1940).
37. See, e.g., B. BERNSTEIN, The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal
Reform, in TOWARDS A NEw PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1968);
M. PARRISH, supra note 33.
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bly least of all would some of his admirers like a commencement
address he gave to his alma mater, Whitman College, in June 1938.
"Our main efforts," he said then, "must lie along the lines of making
as certain as possible that opportunity for work exists and that honest
business has opportunity to make honest and substantial profits." 38
But that was all of a piece with Douglas's remarkable rise from im-
poverishment to national eminence. As a writer in Collier's noted
when Douglas joined the SEC,3 9 it was very much an old-fashioned
American success story. It was, we may add, a particular kind of
success story. Douglas's swift ascent is explained not by a rigid code
of personal discipline but by his buoyancy and adventurousness of
spirit. His youthful admirers should not find it odd, then, when
Douglas voices shock that opponents of the war in Vietnam were
very willing to burn an American flag.40 Unlike Hughes, by whose
cool skills much service was rendered, Douglas's faith in men, moun-
tains, and national ideals has always been passionate. Whatever else
one may think of what he has and has not achieved, that passion
is his appeal.
III
Considered from another perspective, the difference between
Hughes's and Douglas's autobiographies may be said to reflect not
so much a difference in personal temperament as a difference in
their orientations toward the modern American legal culture. Hughes
epitomized that culture; Douglas has persistently deviated from its
norms.
4 1
More than anything else, Justice Hughes was a professional man.
His very austereness of manner conformed to standards of profes-
sional conduct that he knew from observing senior colleagues. The
effective advocate had to be smooth and courteous, "always the gen-
tleman." It was important to have a "poker face" and "never to
appear nervous or to lose poise."42 Much of Hughes's habitual self-
38. DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 36, at 274.
39. Creel, The Young Man Went East, COLLIER'S, May 9, 1936, at 9.
40. DOUGLAS 94-95.
41. Even their styles of physical exercise illustrate the variance in their professional
commitment. For Douglas, a good look at "the older men" in the profession-leaders
of the Wall Street bar-was enough to drive him away. "If I walked their paths," he
says he told himself, "I'd never be able to climb another mountain ....... Id. at 156.
Hughes, on the other hand, was entirely content to follow the advice of one of those
older men, Joseph H. Choate, and thus allowed himself just "moderate" daily activity.
Walking, Choate had suggested, was the "best and most convenient form of exercise
for a professional man." HUGHES 85.
42. HUGHES 90-91.
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mastery, it seems, derived from his acceptance of professional norms
espoused and exemplified by elite practitioners of the New York
bar. The values of that legal community Hughes never seriously
questioned. He had always known what he wanted, the highest pro-
fessional success, and that was to be achieved by emulating men
like Walter S. Carter, whose firm he joined and whose son-in-law
he became. It was gratifying as a young man to be associated with
older lawyers of such "high character and first-rate ability," from
whom he might absorb "the best traditions of the bar."
43
Hughes preferred legal practice to teaching, and seemingly to
politics too. Writing to his parents in 1906, before embarking upon
his first successful race for the New York governorship, he said he
was in a "cold sweat" at the thought of what lay ahead. "I can be
of more service and far happier," he concluded, "in my chosen pro-
fession."'44 No regrets are expressed in the Notes at his return to
Wall Street in 1916,45 after losing the Presidency to Wilson. Nor
is there full comprehension in the Notes of the grounds on which
a third of the Senate opposed his confirmation as Chief Justice in
1930. It was charged by many then, as almost alone William Jennings
Bryan had charged in 1910 when Hughes began six years on the
Court as an Associate Justice, that successful practice on Wall Street
was evidence of loyalty to big business interests. Predictably, and
in a sense correctly, Hughes's defenders responded that he had merely
been engaged in advocacy on behalf of his clients, without regard
to his own sentiments. What were ignored at the time were larger
unsettling questions about the social utility of the advocacy system
in general, the Wall Street bar in particular.
46
Perhaps Hughes did understand some of those questions, having
once been something of an outsider himself, but he had trained
himself to ignore them. In one pregnant paragraph of the Notes
there is an unexpected reference to the financial and social entrench-
ment of the legal profession in New York. "These highly privileged
firms," Hughes observed, "seemed to hold in an enduring grasp the
43. Id. at 74.
44. R. WassER, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES: POLITICS AND REFORM IN NEW YORK, 1905-
1910, at 63 (1967).
45. HUGHES 185-86.
46. Id. at 295-97. See also S. HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT
14-15, 78 (1951); 2 M. PUSEY, supra note 15, at 648-62. Hughes in defense praises the
advocacy system and the right of the rich and powerful to hire lawyers and quotes
a passage from a sympathetic commentator describing how Hughes moved easily from
work for large corporations to representation of clients such. as the United Mine
Workers. HUGHES 295-97.
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best professional opportunities and to leave little room for young
aspirants outside the favored groups." Almost immediately the thought
was suppressed, to be followed by complacent reflections on the "con-
stant fructification" of the bar: "If the young lawyer sees to it that
his work is of the best, and if by intelligence and industry he stands
well in his own generation, he can afford to await his share of the
privileges and responsibilities which to that generation are bound
to come." 47
Douglas's attitude toward the law is vividly different. The true
autobiographer, it would seem, is not professionally sound. Hughes
could recall his satisfaction in 1925, after four years as Secretary
of State, at rejoining his son in the practice of law, the two thus again
enjoying "an intimate professional relation, '48 but Douglas says flatly
that he is glad William, Jr., did not become a lawyer.49 Does Douglas
himself regret his choice of career? In the past he has spoken appre-
ciatively of lawyers, but not often.50 In the beginning it was a lawyer
who persuaded his mother to invest the little money she had, from
her husband's life insurance, in a highly speculative and totally un-
successful irrigation project of which the lawyer was a promoter.0 '
Though apparently this did not diminish the "strong pull" that
law had for young Douglas, legal practice did. Working in the same
New York professional community that had so fascinated Hughes,
Douglas was at times exhilarated, at times depressed. Few of his
friends were lawyers. Later, teaching at Yale, he would exchange
"doubt and misgivings" with Robert Hutchins. Most of the giants
of the Wall Street bar seemed to him to be "shriveled men" who
brought few "spiritual or ethical values" to the system they served
and exploited.52
47. HUGHES 76.
48. Id. at 285.
49. DOUGLAS 250.
50. See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, BEING AN AMERICAN 72-77 (1948) (his 1940 address to the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
51. DOUGLAS 17. When Douglas left Cravath, deGersdorff, Swaine & Wood in New
York for "country practice" in Yakima, he briefly became a partner of the same (but
repentant) lawyer.
52. Id. at 119, 156, 165-66.
These men were spent before their time. When they reached the end of the
corridor and were ready for retirement, they seemed to have no intellectual in-
terests aside from the law.
I looked around at the older men in my profession and I knew I didn't want
to be like any of them. They couldn't climb a mountain, couldn't tie a dry fly;
they knew nothing about the world that was closest to me, the real world, the
natural world.
Id. at 156. Worst of the breed, it appears was John Foster Dulles, whose manner was
"so pontifical" during a job interview that at the end when he helped Douglas on
with his coat, the young man from Yakima turned and gave him a quarter tip. Id. at
149-50. See also id. at 15, 60.
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These early impressions subsequently intensified during his term
of service on the SEC. Over the years, he told the Eastern Law
Students Conference in 1937, there had taken place a "degeneration
of the bar" in America. Lawyers, the "professional tutors" of those
who dominated the financial world, had irresponsibly ignored the
public interest.53 Furthermore, lawyers lived by "outworn symbols,"
he told the Texas Bar Association in 1940, after ascending to the
Supreme Court. "The bar's rebellion to basic change," he complained,
"is apt to be more severe than that of any other group."
54
Out of such experience and observation has emerged Douglas's very
personal style as a lawyer-a style that may properly be called coun-
tercultural, set against prevailing professional norms. A man who has
given his all to the law is a man to be pitied, in Douglas's view.
Instead of recommending the sort of thorough immersion in work
that was characteristic of Hughes, Douglas warns against it. Law is
a "narrowing experience," and must be transcended lest the lawyer
become "a dry husk." 55 Long ago, it is plain, Douglas abandoned
much of the self-congratulatory rhetoric that has accompanied and
promoted the professionalization of the American legal community.
In 1942, speaking at the Ohio State University College of Law, he
sketched out a social vision almost Emersonian in spirit. The Re-
public might be in peril; lawyers might have "special responsibili-
ties" at such a time. But it would be a mistake to rely too heavily
on the bar, and unnecessary. For "the fundamental principles of
our legal system are not technical concepts," he said:
They are as universal as the Christian philosophy that conceived
them. They are preserved not merely in codes but in the hearts
of men. They are understood by school children who may not be
able to explain them. They have been the basis of social and
economic crusades by the rank and file, who, without compre-
hending their origins or their technical aspects, only know that
they call for the fundamentals of fair play and decency. They have
been rallying points for aroused communities who need no law-
yer's brief or citation of precedents to clinch their contention
that the American way of life in some specific part has been
violated.16
53. DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 36, at 233, 238-39. Dulles, for one, is now
said by Douglas to have been guilty of conduct within the purview of the SEC which
might easily have justitied an indictment for perjury. DOUGLAS 279.
54. BEING AN AMERICAN, supra note 50, at 52-53.
55. DOUGLAS 151, 155.
56. BEING AN AMEIUCAN, supra note 50, at 44.
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These are sentiments at odds with the premises of legal professional-
ism, and rooted in that same romantic American mode of expression
that has been at the heart of most of our national autobiography.
The law, Douglas knows well, is not a romantic endeavor 7
Perhaps the ultimate heresy of Mr. Justice Douglas is that he has
not shown full and appropriate respect for the majesty of the par-
ticular office he occupies. What makes this error so especially hor-
rendous is that the image of judgeship, as David Riesman and others
have suggested, has come to represent all that ideologues of profes-
sionalism have sought to certify as the noblest attributes of legal
character.5s Douglas, who was the youngest man after Story to be
appointed to the Supreme Court, has worn his robes casually. In-
deed, he tells us quite openly that he never dreamed of going on
the Supreme Court,5 9 and had no deep sense of fulfillment when
he did. It was in a sense "an empty achievement" for him6°0-an
honor, of course, but also a job that he did not find fully satisfying,
nor fully time-consuming. Early in his judicial career, he determined
to enjoy what he calls "first-class citizenship," by participating in a
wide range of public projects,61 some of which would later figure
in the case for his impeachment. "A man or a woman who becomes
a Justice," says Douglas, "should try to stay alive .... ,,2 Back in
the thirties, while on the SEC, he had learned another thing about
judges. They were "the most reactionary group" in the land, "even
more reactionary than investment bankers." 63 Upon becoming a
Justice, Douglas did not forget his fears of judicial tyranny.
4
All of this has brought Mr. Justice Douglas sharply into conflict
with a professional culture which, as it happens, Charles Evans
Hughes promoted, helped to preserve, and himself came to symbolize.
Fittingly, Hughes first joined the Court as the second of six ap-
pointees of "Judge" William Howard Taft (remembered by Douglas
only as being "greatly overweight" 65), having originally gotten his
57. DOUGLAS 155.
58. See, e.g., D. RIESMAN, INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED AND OTHER ESSAYS 441-42 (1954).
59. DOUGLAS 455.
60. Id. at 465.
61. Id. at 466-69. Douglas even defied the then established tradition that Supreme
Court Justices never voted. Douglas attributes his resolution to engage in civic activ-
ities to his deciding vote in a case holding that federal judges' salaries are fully
taxable. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
62. DOUGLAS 469. His Court work never demands more than four days of his week.
63. "The bankers were usually open to new ideas; the judges were anchored fast
to the past. Precedents were their hallmark. What had once been done was hallowed;
what had never been done was suspect." Id. at 412.
64. BEING AN AMERICAN, supra note 50, at 9-10, 98.
65. DOUGLAS 123.
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start in New York politics as a mugwump proteg6 of Taft's brother
Henry.06 The Taft Presidency, which filled more Court vacancies
than any other but Washington's and FDR's, occurred at a time
when the modern professional ideal of judgeship seems to have
crystallized in the national forum. In part because he attributed
his popularity with the legal profession to expectations that he
would be "conscientious in the selection of judges," whose social-
economic orthodoxy was urgently needed to guard against "the pres-
ent agitation," Taft worked hard at building a Court free of ap-
parent partisanship and thus able to command public esteem. Hughes
he considered "a great appointment," one that made "politics look
petty." The Wall Street Journal agreed, praising "the perfect im-
partiality and the absolutely judicial quality of his mind."'67 (Teddy
Roosevelt also approved, but worried whether Hughes was sufficient-
ly alert to the need for "a very radical change in the attitude of
our judges to public questions." 68) As for the nominee himself, he
told Taft that his "personal inclinations" definitely lay "in the di-
rection of judicial work." He seemed perfectly suitable as the choice
of a President who prided himself on being a connoisseur of the
judiciary. "I love judges and I love courts," Taft is reported once
to have said. "They are my ideals on earth of what we shall meet
afterwards in Heaven under a just God." 69 Cloaked in a mantle of
nonpartisanship and professionalism, they were also guarantees that
the Republic would be safe from "socialistic" experimentation. Stand-
ing at the head of the bar, they attested to the disinterested, public-
spirited functions of lawyers.
From the start, Hughes-"who looks like God and talks like God,"
Robert H. Jackson would later say7 -proved that he had the requi-
site judicial manner and cast of mind. He spent long hours at his
work, in contrast to Douglas's later example, and showed an almost
obsessive sense of the behavioral niceties expected of a Justice. There
was to be one small lapse-when in 1916, despite his eagerness "to
keep the judicial ermine unsullied," he answered the call of duty
by accepting the Republican presidential nomination. "I have wished
to remain on the bench," he told the Convention. That statement
66. McHargue, President Taft's Appointments to the Supreme Court, 12 J. PoL. 478
(1950).
67. S. HENDEL, supra note 46, at 14; 1 H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFT 531 (1939); McHargue, supra note 66, at 489.
68. S. HENDEL, supra note 46, at 13.
69. 1 M. PUSEY, supra note 15, at 272; McHargue, supra note 66.
70. HUGHES xxviii.
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was not enough for some of his critics, who professed shock and
outrage. "The nation has grown to think of its highest judicial
tribune as something stable and permanent," editorialized the New
York Evening World, "wherein men sat as with a final dignity be-
fitting ultimate honor."71 Whatever the harm that had been done,
Hughes fully atoned for his indiscretion during his second term of
service on the Court. As Chief Justice in 1937, he moved determinedly
to strengthen opposition to Roosevelt's court-packing proposals, the
most serious assault upon judgeship in America since the judicial
recall movement of the Progressive period-which Taft had fought
with uncharacteristic vigor.
72
In his Notes Hughes took pains to reaffirm the principle at stake
in 1937, the independence of the Court. Indeed, if there is a dominant
theme running through his recollections, it is his insistence on the
correctness and importance of this principle-against which, to his
apparently never-ending embarrassment, some ill-chosen words of his
while Governor were continually being cited.73 Those words he was
eager to explain in the Notes, where he also denied emphatically
that the Court had in any way buckled to political pressure in its
decisions of 1937.74 To Hughes it was an article of faith that judicial
independence was actual. Nowhere did he state his views more forth-
rightly than in a lecture series he gave at Columbia in 1927. It was
by no means impossible, he was sure, for judges to work "in an
objective spirit," however much skeptical academic lawyers might
wish to maintain the contrary. Most Supreme Court Justices had done
so. "One cannot study their lives and decisions," he argued,
without confidence in their sincerity and independence. The
Supreme Court has the inevitable failings of any human institu-
tion, but it has vindicated the confidence, which underlies the
success of democratic effort, that you can find in imperfect human
beings, for the essential administration of justice, a rectitude of
purpose, a clarity of vision and a capacity for independence, im-
partiality and balanced judgment which will render impotent the
solicitation of friends, the appeals of erstwhile political associates,
and the threats of enemies.
75
71. Id. at 164-65, 180, 181 n.6; S. HENDEL, supra note 46, at 69.
72. 2 M. PUSEY, supra note 15, at 749-65. On Taft and recall, see D. ANDERSON,
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: A CONSERVATIVE'S CONCEPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY 229-33 (1973).
73. HUGHES 143-44 ("We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the
judges say it is ...").
74. Id. at 311-13. Hughes finds the votes of himself, Roberts, and the other crucial
Justices upholding New Deal legislation in 1937 foreshadowed by their earlier votes.
75. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION, METHODS
AND ACHIEVEMENTS 38, 45-46 (1928).
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At the height of the controversy over court-packing, Thurman
Arnold, Douglas's close friend from Yale, complained wryly in the
American Bar Association Journal that practicing lawyers were shy-
ing from realism so far as the Court was concerned, and had allowed
the issue to become "smothered in symbolism."7 6 His complaint had
no effect; even Douglas was unmoved by the case for court-packing.77
One reason Arnold failed to clear the air was the symbolic potency
of Hughes himself, that "judge par excellence," according to the
New York Herald Tribune.78 Hughes was understandably pleased
to be able to claim, as he did in the Notes, that the crisis of 1937
"had the good effect of revealing the strength of public sentiment
in support of the independence of the Court."79 A crucial prop of
20th century American legal culture remained in place.
IV
Probably it is well that it did, however gravely one may view the
general condition of the profession today. Probably, too, the counter-
cultural possibilities suggested by Douglas's life have more appeal as
literature than as policy. Has Douglas's way been effective? Was
Hughes's? Douglas does not directly confront the first question, but
he expresses clearly his admiration of Hughes's record in support
of the freedoms that he, Douglas, so cherishes.80 Hughes guided his
Court toward conclusions that significantly expanded constitutional
protections of political and civil liberties; Roosevelt's appointees,
who formed a majority until 1954, did not as a group show solici-
tude for the same values.8 ' Presumably things would have been dif-
ferent, had Douglas been able to assert leadership within that Court.
But if the familiar criticisms are justified, that he did not and pos-
sibly did not seriously try to do so, then it must be asked whether
his autobiography can serve as a useful example for law as well as
life. Perhaps any future volume of the autobiography will help en-
lighten us.
Douglas has had little use for American Bar Association presidents
("reactionary"), 2 and Harvard law professors, in particular Felix
76. Arnold, A Reply, 23 A.B.A.J. 364 (1937).
77. DOUGLAS 320-21.
78. S. HENDEL, supra note 46, at 277.
79. HUGHES 307
80. DOUGLAS 108.
81. See DOUGLAS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A SELECTION OF HIS OPINIONS 24-26 (V.
Countryman ed. 1959).
82. DOUGLAs 60.
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Frankfurter ("chaemeleonlike"). 83 These may not be unreasonable
aversions. It is also possible to sympathize with his distaste for his-
torians who-like doctors, as Mr. Dooley put it-"are always lookin'
fr symptoms."8' 4 Still, it is not at all evident that Douglas's kind of
legal counterculture has a future. And it is not entirely unrealistic
to think that lawyers may yet find ways to make better service of
their professional culture, to draw on what Douglas once called "the
elements of public trust inherent in their profession."8 5 Perhaps the
recent performances in Washington, as special prosecutors, of a Har-
vard law professor and a former American Bar Association president
confer plausibility on that thought.
83. Id. at 327.
84. DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 36, at 290.
85. Id. at 240.
The Civil Law in England
The Civil Lawyers in England 1603-1641: A Political Study. By Brian
P. Levack. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. x, 311. P5.00
Reviewed by Charles Donahue, Jr.t
As is the case with so many controversies, the controversy over the
influence of the civil law on the development of English law is one
in which the polemical has often preceded the descriptive, in which
questions are answered before they have been precisely stated. Anglo-
American legal writers have long emphasized the uniqueness of the
English legal experience. Pride in the common law, coupled with a
contempt for the continental legal tradition (bred, at least in some
cases, by ignorance), has made these writers want to find that the
contributions of the civil law to our own legal system were small.
The historical reasons for this attitude may be inferred from Pro-
fessor Levack's book.1 In the 17th century the civil law became asso-
ciated in England with royal absolutism, with the Court of Star
Chamber and High Commission, with the enforcement of religious
orthodoxy and the denial of civil liberty. The effects of this associa-
tion can be seen today in those opinions of our Supreme Court which
define the meaning of the Bill of Rights by contrast to the practices
of the "civilian" Stuart monarchy. 2
Beyond the specific objections to the civil law there lies a charac-
teristic strain of anti-intellectualism in common law thinking:
The great American jurist, Holmes, has said that the life of the
law is not logic but experience. This is bred in the bone in English
law. A bench of medieval judges once sneered at a barrister for
using the "sophisticated reasons" of the philosophers at the an-
cient English universities. Law was taught, till the eighteenth
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. B. LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND 1603-1641: A POLITICAL STUDY (1973)
[hereinafter cited to page numbers only].
2. See, e.g., In re Oliver. 333 U.S. 257, 266-71 & nn.21-31 (1948) (Black, J.); Brown
v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896); cf. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445-47
(1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 27-54 (1957); Moreland, Historical Background and Implications
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 44 Ky. L.J. 267 (1956).
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century, only in legal practice at the Inns of Court, a workaday"tough" law in Maitland's view. Inherent in this law is the dis-
trust of philosophical analysis which still survives.3
The view that English law is exclusively a home-grown product
of the British Isles has produced a reaction, perhaps equally silly, that
purports to see Roman law in every Anglo-American legal doctrine
and institution for which a Roman law analogy can be found.4 Al-
though there have been occasional attempts at a balanced appraisal, 5
scholarship has suffered from not having many of the basic documents
available in an accessible form and has lacked the necessary mono-
graphic foundations on which a definitive appraisal could be erected.
On the basis of the work that has been done, we may now safely
begin with the proposition that in England the Roman law did not
survive the Germanic invasions, as it did in some places on the Con-
tinent.6 When the Normans arrived in England, therefore, they found
a legal system almost totally devoid of Roman influence. From this
starting point the traditional view then focuses on three periods of
contact between the English legal system and the civil law.
First, and perhaps most controversial, is the period of the precocious
development of centralized royal justice in the 12th century. Roman
law, some of which was probably derived at second hand through the
academic canon law, may have played some part in that development.7
The earliest English treatise on the common law, known as Glanvill,8
shows considerable acquaintance with the Roman law, and Bracton,
writing in the middle of the 13th century, displays so much knowledge
of the Roman law that the accuracy of his description of English law
may at times be called into question.9
After Bracton the traditional focus of attention shifts to Maitland's
3. Kiralfy, English Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEMS 157, 159 (J. Derrett
ed. 1968).
4. See, e.g., Sherman, The Romanization of English Law, 23 YALE L.J. 318 (1914).
5. See, e.g., J. BARTON, ROMAN LAW IN ENGLAND (Ius Romanum Medii Aevi pars V,
13a, 1971) (leans toward emphasis of civil law); Plucknett, The Relations Between
Roman Law and English Common Law Down to the Sixteenth Century: A General
Survey, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 24 (1939) (leans toward de-emphasis).
6. The analogies to Roman law which may be found in the scanty surviving legal
material from the Anglo-Saxon period can confidently be attributed to the influence
of the Church and not to any native survival of Roman law. See J. BARTON, supra
note 5, at 4-6.
7. For a relatively strong but defensible statement of the influence, see R. VAN
CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL 360-90 (Selden
Soc'y Pub. No. 77, 1959).
8. THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY
CALLED GLANVILL (G. Hall ed. & transl. 1965). Glanvill's "Romanism" is discussed in
id. at xxxvi-xl.
9. See J. BARTON, supra note 5, at 13-24 & n.62.
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thesis that a reception of Roman law was threatened in the 16th cen-
tury.10 Research since Maitland's time would indicate that Maitland
may have overstated the seriousness of this threat, and one respected
legal historian has recently suggested that there was no threat at all,
at least not in the terms in which Maitland conceived of it." But
precisely what did happen during this period and what role civilian
learning played in it are questions that have, as yet, no definitive
answers.
A final period of civilian influence comes in the late 17th and
early 18th centuries. At this time, particularly under the leadership
of Lord Mansfield, the common law courts absorbed much of the law
merchant, and with that law some civilian ideas.12
For all this, the traditional view would emphasize the uniqueness
of the English legal experience. England, alone among the Northern
European countries where the Roman law had not survived the Ger-
manic invasions, did not "receive" Roman law in the 16th century.
It did not, so this view would have it, because its centralized courts
had developed early, because it had learned the Roman analytic meth-
ods through Bracton without accepting the Roman law itself, and be-
cause it had developed a system for recording precedents, the year
books, and centralized institutions for training lawyers, the Inns of
Court, which enabled it to resist the onslaughts of Romanism in the
16th century. 13
More careful proponents of the traditional view do not suggest that
all the law in England from the 12th to the 19th centuries is to be
found in that applied in the King's superior common law courts.
They have a tendency, however, to look at the non-common-law courts
as oddities-"eccentrical tribunals," Blackstone called them14-fore-
runners of what they became in the 19th century, the Probate, Divorce,
and Admiralty Divisions of the High Court.
Despite the importance of the common law courts, it is easy to
10. F. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE (Rede Lecture 1901), reprinted
in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 168-207 (Ass'n of Am. Law
Schools ed. 1907).
11. Thorne, English Law and the Renaissance, in ATrI DEL PRIMO CONGRESSO IN-
TERNAZIONALE DELLA SOCIET ITALIANA DI STORIA DEL DIRrTTo, LA STORIA DEL DnuTTo
NEL QUADRO DELLE SCIENCE STORICHE 437 (1966).
12. See generally C. FIFooT, LORD MANSFIELD 82-117 (1936); 5 W. HouswoRTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 102-54 (3d ed. 1945); 6 id. 519-22 (2d ed. 1937); 12 id. 524-42
(1938); Sutherland, The Law Merchant in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries, 17 TRANS. ROYAL HIST. SoC'Y 149 (4th ser. 1934).
13. See, e.g., F. MAITLAND, Outlines of English Legal History, in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS
417, 438-45 (H. Fisher ed. 1911); see also F. MAITLAND, supra note 10.
14. 3 I. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 086.
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overemphasize their importance if we look at English legal history
from the vantage point of the common law courts' ultimate triumph.
If we instead take the point of view, say, of a sophisticated 14th cen-
tury litigant, the picture is considerably different. True, if the liti-
gant is not a serf, he will be advised that the common law courts have
taken over much of what had formerly been feudal jurisdiction.' 5
But he still has a bewildering variety of courts in addition to the
superior common law courts open to him, depending on who he is
and what kind of claim he has. His claim, for example, may be heard
in a county court, in a church court, in a borough court, or in a mer-
chant court. He may try the as yet ill-defined jurisdiction of Chan-
cellor. Indeed, certain cases may be heard before the High Court of
Parliament itself. From what is now known of the county courts, we
would expect to find little penetration of the learned law in them."6
On the other hand, in the church courts our litigant will find the
academic Romano-canon law being applied. The importance of this
law for the development of English law can only be determined when
more of the records of the medieval ecclesiastical courts are published,
when we have a clearer idea of the extent of these courts' jurisdiction.
The work that has been done would indicate that if our litigant's case
concerns a promise, a marriage, a will, a piece of ecclesiastical property,
defamation, or a group of offenses which might roughly be described
as morals offenses, he may well find himself in an ecclesiastical court.
17
In the merchant courts, where our litigant may go if he is a merchant,
the law applied will be the custom of merchants, a diverse body of
rules that will become a transnational body of law with substantial
civil law underpinnings.' 8 Some influence of the law merchant can
be seen as well in the borough courts.' 9 The civil law element in the
law applied in Chancery and in the High Court of Parliament is
more problematic. There can be little doubt, however, that the shape
of the procedure before these bodies displays the influence of the
learned law.
20
15. See S. MiLsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 8-12, 376 (1969).
16. See W. MORRIS, THE EARLY ENGLISH COUNTY COURTS (14 U. CALIF. PUB. IN HIST.
No. 2, at 89-230, 1926); S. MILsOM, supra note 15, at 6-8, 376.
17. See Donahue, Roman Canon Law in the Medieval English Church: Stubbs vs.
Maitland Re-examined after 75 years in the Light of Some Records from the Church
Courts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 647, 658-70 (1974).
18. See W. MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT (Yorke
Prize Essay 1904). But see Sutherland, supra note 12, at 151-54 for the suggestion that
the law merchant does not acquire a cohesive character until the Renaissance.
19. See, e.g., 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS lxvii-lxxxv (M. Bateson ed., Selden Soc'y Pub. No.
21, 1906).
20. See J. BARTON, supra note 5, at 28-71.
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If we move to Professor Levack's period, the reigns of James I and
Charles I, shortly after the period in which Maitland perceived a
threat of reception, the situation is even more confused. At the local
level, our hypothetical litigant will still find county and borough
courts and local ecclesiastical courts, with ultimate appeal from these
latter now to the High Court of Delegates, instead of to the Court
of Rome. In addition, if he lives in the right part of the country,
his case may be heard before the Council of the North or the Council
of Wales and the Marches. At Westminster he will find that the su-
perior common law courts have lost some business to the newer con-
ciliar courts, the Court of Star Chamber and of Requests, and to the
Privy Council itself, as well as to the increasingly active jurisdiction
of the Chancery.21 In addition, the High Court of Admiralty and
local admiralty courts are seeking to expand their jurisdiction over
mercantile matters, while an offshoot of the Council, the High Com-
mission (Commissions for Ecclesiastical Causes), is tending to draw
business away from the regular ecclesiastical courts.22
Of this multiplicity of courts only the ecclesiastical and admiralty
courts are distinctly civil law courts, applying civil law and dominated
by civil lawyers. In the conciliar courts and the Chancery, the civilians
filled some but by no means all of the positions.23 As in the medieval
Chancery, civil law influence can be seen in the shape of the pro-
cedure of these courts; how much its influence goes beyond that is a
difficult question.
In summary, current research forces us to discard any notions we
may have had of the total isolation of English legal development from
the academic law. It also indicates that if we want to have a full un-
derstanding of how the English legal system operated in the Middle
Ages and Renaissance, the non-common law is worth further examina-
tion. That examination has already begun. Marsden and Senior have
studied the admiralty jurisdiction.24 More recently, Woodcock has
given us a view of the medieval diocesan court of Canterbury; 25 Mar-
21. For a readable account of these developments with a strong point of view, see
C. OGILVIE, THE KING'S GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMON LAW 1471-1641 (1958). On the
chancery, see W.J. JONEs, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY (1967).
22. On the High Court of Admiralty, see 2 SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF AD-
MIRALTY xii-xv, xli-lvii (R. Marsden ed., Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 11, 1897); on the High
Commission, see R. USHER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HIGH COMMISSION 91-105 (1913).
23. Pp. 21-30.
24. 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY (R. Marsden ed., Selden Soc'y Pub.
No. 6, 1892); 2 id. (No. 11, 1897); W. SENIOR, DOCTORS' COM IONS AND THE OLD COURT
OF ADMIRALTY (1922).
25. B. WOODCOCK, MEDIEVAL ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE DIOCESE OF CANTERBURY
(1952).
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chant has studied the ecclesiastical courts, particularly the York courts
under Elizabeth I, James I and Charles 1,26 and more on the ecclesias-
tical courts is promised.27 Squibb has studied the High Court of
Chivalry, 28 Duncan the High Court of Delegates. 29 Usher's pioneering
study of the High Commission will be considerably enhanced when
Tyler's study of the Ecclesiastical Commission of York is published.30
Jones has given us an excellent study of the Elizabethan court of
Chancery,31 and there exist Selden Society volumes on the Council,
the Court of Requests, the Star Chamber and the law merchant.
32
So far the studies have tended to focus on an individual court. Such
a focus permits the scholar to work with relatively well-catalogued
and well-defined archival material, to construct an institutional his-
tory and to keep his analysis of cases within jurisdictional bounds.
Such studies are necessary, but they are confining. They lead, without
their authors' intending that they do so, to associating a body of legal
ideas, in this case the civil law, with a given set of legal institutions,
the civil law courts. Further, they tend to make us look lineally at
a given segment of the legal system rather than at how all the pieces
of the system fit together at any given time.
Professor Levack boldly takes another approach. Rather than look-
ing at any one court, he has chosen to look at the body of men who
practiced before a number of courts-the doctors of civil law from
Oxford and Cambridge who were active in England in a variety of
roles during the reigns of James I and Charles I.
Levack's thesis unfolds carefully from chapter to chapter of the
book. He begins by outlining the social and economic characteristics
of the 200 men with whom he is dealing. By and large his civil lawyers
rank lower on the socioeconomic scale than do the common lawyers of
26. R. MARCHANT, THE CHURCH UNDER LAW: JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE
IN THE DIOCESE OF YORK 1560-1640 (1969).
27. The Selden Society has announced volumes on the ecclesiastical courts of Can-
terbury in the 13th century and those of York in the 14th and 15th.
28. G. SQUIBB, THE HIGH COURT OF CHIVALRY (1959). This court, which dealt with
military and heraldic matters, was also a civil law court.
29. G. DUNCAN, THE HIGH COURT OF DELEGATES (Cambridge Stud. in Legal Hist. 1971).
30. R. USHER, supra note 22; P. Tyler, The Ecclesiastical Commission for the Province
of York 1561-1641, 1967 (unpublished D. Phil. thesis on file in the Bodleian Library,
Oxford).
31. W.J. JONES, supra note 21.
32. SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING'S COUNCIL (I. Leadham & J. Baldwin eds., Selden
Soc'y Pub. No. 35, 1918); SELECT CASES IN THE COUNCIL OF HENRY VII (C. Bayne & W.
Dunham eds., Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 75, 1956); SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF REQuSs,
A.D. 1497-1569 (I. Leadham ed., Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 12, 1898); SELECT CASES BEFORE THE
KING'S COUNCIL IN THE STAR CHAMBER, 1477-1544 (I. Leadham ed., Selden Soc'y Pub.
No. 16, 1903); 2 id. (No. 25, 1911); 1 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT (C.
Gross ed., Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 23, 1908); 2 id. (H. Hall ed., No. 46, 1930); 3 id. (H.
Hall ed., No. 49, 1932).
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the same period. They are the sons of merchants and the second sons
of gentry, not the heirs of landed estates.33 They lived by their wits,
and they needed professional positions in order to advance economi-
cally. At the beginning of the 17th century, when Levack's story be-
gins, the profession is in trouble. From a high point in the decade
of the 1580's, the number of doctors of civil law graduating from
Oxford and Cambridge is on the decline. Perhaps as a result of the
common lawyers' reaction to the loss of business to the civilian-orient-
ed courts, James was not preferring civil lawyers in the way that
Elizabeth had.
34
The crisis, according to Levack, led the civil lawyers to seek help
from their usual sources of preferment, the King and the Church. In
the succeeding chapters he tries to show how the civil lawyers used
their learning to defend the royal prerogative in the political arena,35
to make use of their jurisdiction to further the purposes of the King
and the Church,3 6 and thus to become intimately associated with the
prevailing ecclesiastical polity that was to collapse thunderously in
the Long Parliament.3 7
As a profession the civilians never regained the position that they
had prior to the Long Parliament. Some of the positions which they
had held, such as those in the Court of Requests and the High Com-
mission, were abolished; the positions in Chancery became exclusively
the province of the common lawyers; the positions in the Church
courts never achieved the importance after the Restoration that they
had had before. Doctors' Commons, the High Court of Admiralty and
the Church courts continued, but the beginnings of their decline as
33. Pp. 9-16.
34. Pp. 60-66. There may not be any necessary connection between the civilians'
perceived economic difficulties at the beginning of the 17th century and the common
lawyers' assault on their jurisdiction. For example, the analysis that has been done of
the case loads of the local ecclesiastical courts shows no significant decline in the cases
being heard. See R. MARCHANT, supra note 26, at 16 (Table 2, Norwich Consistory Liti-
gation, 1509-10), at 20 (Table 3, Norwich Consistory Litigation, 1623-24, 1626-37), at
62 (Table 8, Cases Entering the York Consistory Court, 1561-1639), at 68 (Table 9, Cases
Entering the York Chancery Court, 1571-1635), at 110 (Table 10, York Exchequer Liti-
gation, 1592-93, 1637-38). (Dr. Ralph Houlbrooke's forthcoming study of the Norwich
court during this period should be a considerable help in this regard.) Quite independent
reasons may be found for the civil lawyers' economic difficulties. For one thing this
is a period of increasing laicization of the civil law profession, and laymen, unlike clergy-
men, cannot rely on a benefice to provide them their basic income. Secondly, with
an economic naivet6 that is typical of the period, the Church, under parliamentary
pressure, displayed great reluctance to raise the statutorily-fixed fees charged to liti-
gants, while at the same time England experienced a 650 percent inflation between
the years 1500 and 1640. On both points, see id. at 243-45; on the fees point, see id. at
21-31, 51-54, 111-12, 134-36, 140-45, 189-92. Levack also discusses fees. See pp. 66-72.
35. Pp. 86-121 (ch. 3).
36. Pp. 122-95 (chs. 4-5).
37. Pp. 196-202 (ch. 6).
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independent and effective institutions can be seen as early as the
Restoration.8
Levack's thesis is an attractive one. It explains why the common
law, which at one time might almost be described as a partner in
England of a number of other civil-law based systems of law, ulti-
mately came to triumph. In the struggle between King and Parlia-
ment, court and country, the civilians of necessity backed the wrong
horse, and the civil law was severed from English legal development
when Charles I's head was severed from his body. The thesis also goes
much of the way to explaining why the civil law is held in such bad
odor in American legal circles, and why it comes out so badly in
the peculiarly whiggish view of English history that is favored by our
Supreme Court. If we can associate the civil law with absolutism,
whether there is any necessary connection between the two or not,
then we are against it because that is what the Founding Fathers
were trying to get away from.
Levack's work in its broad outlines is a careful and helpful book.
He has worked long and hard in the basic source materials and has
assembled an impressive amount of information. The biographical
dictionary of his 200 civilians appended at the end of the book is a
labor of love which will serve scholars for many years to come.39 He
has shown us the political ideas and alliances of an interesting group
of men in a critical period of English constitutional and political
history. The book is not, however, and does not purport to be, a
complete assessment of the role that the civil law played in the de-
velopment of English law during this period.
Viewed as a study of the profession of civil law in England in the
first half of the 17th century, the book is confined to the 200 lawyers
who were at the very top of their profession from an academic point
of view, and it is limited to the institution, Doctors' Commons, which
many of them used as a base for their activities. But the bread-and-
butter courts of the civil lawyers, the ecclesiastical courts, were not
staffed exclusively by the doctors of the civil law. For example, relative-
ly few of Levack's lawyers appear in the ecclesiastical courts of York
during this period.40 I do not know what an intensive study of all
38. For the depressing story of the state of the ecclesiastical courts just prior to
reform, see Manchester, The Reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts, 10 Ass. J. LEcAL Hisr.
51 (1966).
39. Pp. 203-82. The book also contains a useful bibliography of both printed and
unprinted sources, although the usefulness of the latter would have been enhanced if
the publishers had allowed Levack the space to give at least short-titles and authors of
the manuscript tracts and treatises.
40. See R. MARCHANT, supra note 26, at 247.
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the personnel of the York Court would reveal. Certainly one would
not be surprised to find that these men, too, espoused orthodox re-
ligious positions. On the other hand, since the York lawyers had their
roots deep in the countryside, we might find that the York lawyers
were not as closely associated with the political positions of the court
as their London contemporaries with greater academic qualifications.
Levack's omission of the civilians in the provinces has some sub-
stantive ramifications. First, it makes it easier for him to say that
the civilians' political positions were influenced by their self-interest.
If we could determine what the political views of the provincial ci-
vilians were, we would have a valuable check on Levack's thesis, since
the provincial lawyers' self-interest was not nearly so closely asso-
ciated with the King and the court. Second, Levack's book can give
one the impression that the civilians were a considerably narrower
group than they actually were. The doctors did not have a monopoly
on civilian writing; indeed Henry Swinburne's treatises on wills and
spousals 41 were certainly among the most important pieces of civilian
writing in this period. Thus, if we are trying to fashion an accurate
picture of the 17th century legal system, we cannot ignore the men
in the provinces, because a large number of cases were tried in their
courts.4 2 Nor should we ignore them if we are trying to assess the
impact of the civil law on the common law, since the practitioners
of the common law may well have come to know the civil law through
the local church courts or the writings of such men as Swinburne.
Although considerable work still needs to be done, the main out-
lines of the English civil law courts, as institutions, are now reason-
ably clear, and thanks to Levack's book we now have some idea of
the civilians as men. We have gone beyond the narrow confines of
specific courts, again thanks to Levack's book, but we are still in
the realm of the institutional-the civil law courts as institutions, the
body of lawyers who practiced before them as an institution. Further,
because of the excellent work which has been done with civil law
institutions, we are in danger of equating the history of civil law in-
stitutions in England with the history of the civil law itself, of seeing
in the failure of the former to establish and maintain a significant
position the ultimate insignificance of the latter.
As to the impact of the civil law on English political and consti-
41. H. SWINBURNE, A BRIEFE TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLES (1590); H.
SWINBURNE, A TREATISE OF SPOUSALS (1686). The former went through at least seven
editions and was still being published as a practice book in 1803.
42. See generally R. MARCHANT, supra note 26.
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tutional ideas, Levack's answer-that it was a body of doctrine from
which a group of men, driven by the pressure of circumstances, de-
rived justifications for a position that ultimately lost in the political
battle-must be accepted only as a partial one. Levack has discovered,
as many law students have before him, that law is malleable stuff.
43
Two civilians, relying on the same texts of the civil law, could reach
diametrically opposite political conclusions. John Cowell was proceed-
ed against in Parliament for his extreme views of absolute monarchy,
whereas Isaac Dorislaus became a regicide.
4 4
It is not Levack's view, then, that civil law necessarily leads to ab-
solutism. Rather it was the civil lawyers' need for preferment that
determined their association with royal absolutism, the Church, and
the court, against the parliamentary party, the Puritans, and the
country. Thus Levack's thesis is deterministic, and this political de-
terminism is not really undercut by his one attempt at qualification
in the concluding chapter.
45
By detailing the divergent stories of men such as Dorislaus and
Cowell and by showing how others, such as Marten, could, despite
views generally in accord with the prevailing ideas of the civil law
tradition, support the Petition of Right,4 6 Levack has demonstrated
that all the conclusions of the writers in the mainstream do not
follow ineluctably from the basic civil law texts. We should not con-
clude from his book, however, that the civilians' general position can
only be explained by self-interest. Perhaps more importantly, Levack
has not shown what there was about these texts of the civil law that
gave them such power that men felt they had to come to grips with
them in propounding their political ideas. Perhaps Levack's percep-
tion of the civilians' self-interest has led him to underestimate the
role their ideas played in determining the course of English political
and legal development. For example, the civilians have much to say
about sovereignty, an idea which they borrow from Jean Bodin, him-
self a civilian, and a quality which they attribute to the King.47 Ul-
timately English political thought is to keep the idea but reject the
attribution, transferring the locus of sovereignty to Parliament. 4
There was obviously something about the idea of sovereignty that men,
including the civilians who introduced it, found powerfully attrac-
43. See pp. 86-95, 109-21, 152-54.
44. Pp. 4, 224.
45. P. 200.
46. Pp. 117-21.
47. Pp. 97-98, 101-02.
48. See C. OGmviE, supra note 21, at 152-55.
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tive, but Levack contents himself with a thorough description of what
the civilians said and disappoints, at least this reader, by not applying
his substantial body of knowledge to the question of what it was that
gave the civilians' ideas such power.
The relationship between what goes on on the high level of theory
and what actually goes on in the courtroom may be tenuous in the
extreme, and it is at the level of the courtroom that Levack's book
is most incomplete. The book is rightly subtitled a "political study."
It is the work of a careful historian who is interested in lawyers, their
political ideas and alliances, but it is not really a work of legal his-
tory, if we define "legal history" as the history of legal doctrine, of
courts, and of cases.49
The civil lawyers with whom Levack is dealing had received exten-
sive university training in their discipline. He regards this training
as highly impractical,5° but did it have no effect on the judgments
49. Indeed, it is in the minutiae of legal history that Levack makes the only errors
or questionable statements which I found. For example: (I) The fact that Robert
Newcomb was his great uncle's legatee did not give him "in effect" "control of the
entire family estate" (p. 14), since the family was a landed one. The history of the
family that Levack suggests, however, indicates that Newcomb may well have been
his great uncle's heir, or he may have been his great uncle's devisee, both of which
might have given him the family lands. (2) It is unlikely that "the emperors of Ul-
pian's time [early 3d c., A.D.] ruled by the classical lex de imperio Vespasiani . . .,.'
and Schulz does not say that they did (p. 94 & n.1). What Schulz says on the cited
page is that "we know by the lex de imperio Vespasiani that only a strictly limited
power was given to [the emperor] ." The lex may have been a purely political docu-
ment used on a one-time basis to still people's fears after the traumatic events of
69 A.D. (3) The Henrican Commission to revise the canon law did complete its as-
signment (p. 183). Professor Donald Logan of Emmanuel College announced the dis-
covery of a manuscript of the commission's work at the International Congress of
Medieval Canon Law in Toronto in August 1972 (perhaps too late for inclusion in
Levack's work). (4) On pp. 33-34 we learn that Dr. John Burman, sitting as judge
of the Vice-Admiralty Court in Norfolk, when confronted with a Mayor who had
ordered jurors that Burman had summoned not to perform their office, "'acquainted
the said Mayor that he was about Her Majesty's service and told him that he greatly
wondered how he durst offer such a disturbance in the execution thereof.'" While
Levack suggests that this incident illustrates the peculiar attachment of the civilians
to the central authority they served, I cannot imagine that a common law assize
judge, confronted with the same act of contempt, would not have replied in language
at least as strong. (5) On p. 156 Levack states that the "civilians' initial presumption
that the accused was guilty serves as only one indication of their partiality." This
just will not do. That the civil law has a presumption of guilt in criminal cases is a
shibboleth that Merryman on the cited page (id. at n.l) is trying to dispel. Usher at
the page cited in the same note makes quite clear how strict the civil law of proof
applied by the High Commission was, and shows that the source of the problem is
the civilians' statement that accusation creates a sufficient praesumptio that the ac-
cused must come forward and deny the charge, a shift of the burden of coming
forward which was shifted back upon the denial of the charge. It is well to point out
that at common law at this time a person who refused to plead to a felony charge
was crushed with weights until he did plead or died. Compared to this, a shifting
of the burden of coming forward seems quite civilized. It was not until 1827 in England
that refusal to plead at common law was treated as a plea of not guilty rather than
an admission of guilt.
But these are counsels of perfection. As a whole the work is careful and well-written.
50. Pp. 16-18.
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the civilians reached when they were daily confronted by social reality
in their courts? Levack suggests, and he may be on the track of some-
thing quite significant here, that the civilians had a different style of
judgment from the style professed by the common lawyers. Despite
their more rule-oriented system, the civilians handled their cases in
a less rigid way than did the common lawyers.51 Unfortunately, Le-
vack pulls back from this suggestion after he makes it, without a sys-
tematic analysis of the types of cases and the law applied in the civil
law courts.
As to the possible influence of the civil law on the practice of the
common law courts, Levack tells us little; he is studying civil lawyers,
not common lawyers. He does suggest, however, that the relationship
between the two groups was not always as strained as when they op-
posed each other in Parliament. They served together, apparently
amicably, on the High Court of Delegates, the High Commission, the
Court of Requests, and in Chancery, and a number of civilians were
admitted to membership in the Inns of Court, although none seems
to have been called to the bar.,2 All of this suggests a working rela-
tionship and at least the opportunity for echange of ideas.
What evidence can we find for influence of the civil law on the
development of the common law? As I suggested before, the problem
suffers from a lack of definition. While the citation of cases as au-
thorities is at least as old as Bracton, the doctrine of precedent does
not achieve its modem form until the 18th century.5 When English
courts in the 19th century cite Roman law (which they do more fre-
quently than one might think),54 it is clear that the citation is to an
"academic" authority, an authority which will be followed only in
the absence of domestic authority and only because it is persuasive,
not because it is binding. Until the doctrine of binding authorities
was developed, however, the distinction between "academic" and
"binding" authorities was considerably fuzzier. Further, the absence
of citation of civil law authorities in the year books is not conclusive,
since those books are, by and large, concerned with the pleading stage
of a case. Nonetheless, the general absence of citations to civil law in
both the later year books and the earlier common law reports would
seem to indicate that civil law was not "authoritative" in the common
51. Pp. 152-57.
52. Pp. 126-30.
53. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 146.
54. See Oliver, Roman Law in Modern Cases in English Courts, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL
ESSAYS WRITTEN IN HONOUR OF AND PRESENTED TO DOCTOR BOND, PROFESSOR BUCKLAND
AND PROFESSOR KENNY 243 (P. Winfield &: A. McNair eds. 1926).
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law courts in this period, at least in the sense that it was not a body
of doctrine to which counsel regularly asked the judges to turn for
the resolution of specific questions of law. 5
Failing discovery there, we must look for the influence of the civil
law in the way in which English law in its broad outlines changed
over the course of the 16th and 17th centuries. The common law at
the end of the 15th century was in a sorry state. Narrowly confined
to property and crime with a few rudimentary ideas of tort and con-
tract, the system had declined to one that was procedurally unwork-
able for all but the richest and the most patient, and substantively
incapable of handling the great commercial expansion that was to
come. Somehow two centuries later, the system had withstood the
challenge of the conciliar courts and had managed to incorporate
enough new ideas that the cry for more radical reform died down.
Did at least some of the new ideas come from the civil law?
If we look for civil law influence in the specific rules that the com-
mon law or equity courts adopted, we quickly find ourselves in a
hopeless morass. For every principle of common law alleged to have
civil law ancestry, there is a case to be cited which explains it totally
in common law terms, or a text from the Digest which suggests that
the civil law rule was really quite different.57
The problem with this kind of analysis is that it glorifies the spe-
cific rule by which the case is decided and underplays the basic prin-
ciples underlying the rule and the methodology used to arrive at that
55. The situation in Chancery is considerably more difficult to assess, since the
court throughout the 17th century was only gradually developing a system of precedents.
See I LORD NOTrINGHAM'S CHANCERY CASES xxvii-cxxiv (D. Yale ed., Selden Soc'y Pub.
No. 73, 1957). The question, then, is what was it that informed the Chancellor's con-
science when the decision turned on it, and what role did the learned law play in
the hardening of the principles that were to become the rules of equity? Jones sug-
gests that the connection between equity and the civil law is tenuous at best. W.J.
JONES, supra note 21, at 266, 301. Others have suggested civil law influences on specific
bodies of doctrine. See, e.g., T. SCRUTrON, THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN LAW ON THE
LAW OF ENGLAND 152-62 (Yorke Prize Essay 1885). The opportunity for civilian influence
was there, both from the civilian-trained masters of the court and from the fact that the
three great 17th century chancellors-Ellesmere, Bacon and Nottingham-were all men
who had considerable acquaintance with continental learning. See 2 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES
OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 309-10 (4th ed. 1856) (Ellesmere); 3 id. 5-6 (4th ed. 1857)
(Bacon); I LORD NOTrINGHAM'S CHANCERY CASES, supra, at xxxiv n.3 (Nottingham). But
this leads us to the consideration of influence on principles and methodology rather
than on specific rules, and to the point next developed in the text.
56. On the situation of the common law in the 15th century, see C. OGILVIE, supra
note 21, at 13-14, 19-24, 43-54; A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 119-39
(1966). For the suggestion that there were few changes in the 17th century and that
the Interregnum was a great opportunity lost, see id. at 265-67; D. VEALL, THE POPULAR
MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM 1640-1660, at 225-40 (1970).
57. This is particularly characteristic of the debates concerning the influence of the
civil law on the early development of the common law. See sources cited in notes 7-9
supra.
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rule. If it is true that the life of the law has not been logic but ex-
perience, it is equally true that that experience has been shaped by
the power of certain fundamental ideas and methods of proceeding.
And in the development of these ideas and methods in England, ci-
vilian influence may have played some part.
As an example of the type of elements in the English law which
suggest the influence of civil law ideas, consider the limitation actls
passed by Parliament in 1623, right in the middle of Levack's period.
This act is the ancestor of our own statutes of limitations for actions
to recover real property, and its history is known to every first-year
property student: What is worded as a simple statute of limitations
became the statutory basis of the doctrine of adverse possession with
the familiar judicially engrafted requirements that the possession be
actual, continuous, open and notorious, and hostile, with the frequent
addition that it be under "(good faith) claim of right" and "color of
title."59 A great deal has been written emphasizing how the common
law system of limitation differs from the civil law system of acquisitive
prescription.60 The point is not often made, however, that adverse
possession, in the hands of at least some judges, looks remarkably like
acquisitive prescription, without quite the civilian emphasis on bona
fides.6t Whether this result was foreseen by the framers of the 1623
statute is hard to know. The notion of prescription was, however, not
unknown to them; it had been brought into English law by Bracton
to compensate for the fact that the common law of his day had no
system of limitation that applied to someone claiming a nonpossessory
right to the land of another.6 2 The preamble to the 1623 statute
states twin purposes: "avoiding of suits" and "quieting of men's es-
tates." 63 The former idea is clearly derived from the notion of limita-
tion, but the latter certainly smacks of prescription.
The question which I am suggesting needs further exploration is
not whether a "reception" of Roman law was threatened in the 16th
or 17th centuries, nor whether the institutions of the civil law, their
courts, and the body of civil lawyers themselves were stronger than
recent research would suggest they were.6 4 Nor am I suggesting that
58. 21 Jac. 1, c.16.
59. See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 15.1-15.14, at 755-831 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952).
60. See, e.g., B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 120-30 (1962).
61. See, e.g., Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60, 97 Eng. Rep. 190 (K.B. 1757) (Mansfield,
L.C.J.); cf. City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908 (1929).
62. See W. HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW 279-86 (1927).
63. 21 Jac. 1, c.16, preamble.
64. See, e.g., Ives, The Common Lawyers in Pre-Reformation England, 18 TRANS.
ROYAL HIsT. Soc'Y 145 (5th ser. 1968).
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at least the main elements in the movement for law reform were mo-
tivated by a desire to abandon the "barbaric" common law for the
more "elegant" civil law.65 The evidence seems quite convincing that
there was no real danger of reception, that the civil law institutions
never posed a serious threat to the common law, and that the motiva-
tion for the most thoughtful of the reform writing was not an in-
tellectual but a practical one. What I am suggesting needs more study
is what role the learned law played in shaping the reactions of the
English legal system, a system concededly dominated by common
lawyers, to the felt need for reform.
In the latter part of the 17th century and in the 18th, the academic
civilians on the Continent abandoned the idea of getting the Digest
as such accepted as an authoritative body of law in the courts and
began instead to use the civil law as a means for determining certain
first principles of law-what we might today call fundamental Western
legal ideas and what they called natural law.66 The abrasive contact
between the civil law taught in the academies, the non-civil law es-
poused in the courts, and the diverse human conflicts which call for
resolution led thoughtful men to search for first principles. That
contact occurred in England at many times, most notably in the 16th
and early 17th centuries, and it is the effect of this contact that ought
to be more fully explored.
65. See pp. 131-33, on the attitude of the humanists. See generally D. VEALL, supra
note 56, for what the reformers were after.
66. See A. PASSERIN D'ENThEVES, NATURAL LAw 51-64 (2d ed. 1970); B. NICHOLAS,
supra note 60, at 50-51.
In Pursuit of the Public Interest
The Genteel Populists. By Simon Lazarus. New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1974. Pp. xvii, 303. $8.95.
Reviewed by Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr.t
I
The "public interest" law movement has been at least partly de-
fined by its economic problems, since the movement-and even its
name-has been a response to the failures of the private market for
legal resources.' The public interest lawyers' broad goal-representing
the "unrepresented"-obviously has an important economic dimension,
for the distinction between the "private" lawyer and the public interest
lawyer rests fundamentally on the fact that they have different sources
of income.2 The private lawyer earns his daily wage by competing in
the market for legal resources, giving his talents to the highest (or,
at the least, to very substantial) bidders. By contrast, the public inter-
est lawyer seeks to provide legal counsel for individuals or groups
who have not been able to compete in the market for legal talent and
obtain quality legal representation. Such public interest advocacy
often involves significant subsidies from a variety of public and pri-
vate sources. And the existence of the subsidy means that public in-
terest lawyers are continually forced to offer justifications for their
work to either their public or private benefactors.3
The Genteel Populists4 is an extended essay summarizing the efforts
of 20th century American reformers to make corporate and other
vested interests "accountable" to the public, one that in the end
endorses and justifies public interest law. In concluding that public
t Attorney, Center for Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C.
1. See generally Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970);
Al. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION (1974). For a bibliography relating to public interest law, see Selected Ma-
terials on Public Interest Law Firms, 28 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 328 (1973).
2. Public interest and private lawyers are, of course, to be distinguished from "public"
lawyers, those who are employed by agencies of government.
3. Private lawyers do not have to give justifications to third parties for their efforts
to take paying clients and achieve economic rewards within a conventional market
structure.
4. S. LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS (1974) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
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interest lawyers are important defenders of the populist ideal, Lazarus
observes that the future of public interest law practice turns on the
issue of finding stable and significant sources of financial support for
this type of legal practice. In this review, I will discuss Lazarus's book
in the context of the relationship between public interest law's ide-
ology and its future sources of funding. And before doing so, I offer
a few framing thoughts.
A.
General justifications of public interest law have recognized two
types of citizen interests which need either provision of basic indi-
vidual legal services or the advancement of more collective concerns
through law reform efforts at the judicial, administrative or legislative
levels. In this century, the goal of representing the unrepresented
originated with a concern over the plight of "weak minorities" in a
democracy-the poor, political dissidents or victims of racial discrimi-
nation. And the earliest organized manifestations of public interest
law-the legal aid societies, the American Civil Liberties Union and
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.-were a re-
sponse to the classic problem of protecting relatively powerless minor-
ity interests from an overbearing majority through provision of legal
counsel. 5 Subsequently, with the growth of government intervention
in social and economic life, the need arose to protect the interests of
a "diffuse majority" from the untoward influence on government
agencies of corporate and other highly organized groups. Such influ-
ence frustrated implementation of legislation aimed at promoting a
general public good.6 Weak minority interests tend to arise from
lower economic strata; diffuse majority interests tend to be more
5. For an account of the origins of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., see M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 5-10 (1973).
6. The phrase "public interest law" is sometimes used to refer only to "diffuse
majority" efforts thus excluding "weak minority" (poverty and civil rights) law. This
more limited usage of the term has its origins in the 1970 Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) guidelines for tax exemptions, which are "applicable to organizations formed
to provide legal representation in the public interest. . . . These proposed programs
are frequently in support of the interests of a majority of the public, as distinguished
from legal representation for a disadvantaged minority, such as the poor, the victims of
racial discrimination, or those denied human and civil rights either in criminal or
civil matters." See Hearings on Tax Exemptions for Charitable Organizations Affecting
Poverty Programs Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings]. See also FORD FOUNDATION, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM:
NEw VOICES FOR NEW CONSTITUENCIES 9-10 (1973).
This review will not use the narrower definition of public interest law adopted by
the IRS.
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middle class in character. Both types, however, lack the resources and
organizational muscle to counter expressions of power either by ma-
joritarian instruments (in the case of weak minorities) or concentrated
centers of private power (in the case of diffuse majorities). The result
is a need for public interest law-at least as expressed in the promo-
tional stages of public interest law's development.
7
To some proponents of public interest law, the rubric "representing
the unrepresented" reflects, in essence, a procedural set of values.
Regardless of whether the public interest lawyer represents weak mi-
nority or diffuse majority citizen interests, providing legal counsel to
those unable to afford it serves to increase access to rule-making and
justice-dispensing bodies. Public interest law is thus justified from
the procedural perspective as enhancing either the adversary process
(when courts or administrative units are involved) or the pressure-
group dominated political process (when the legislatures, the execu-
tive or political parties are the targets of "legal" efforts). When
supporters of public interest law justify their efforts in these terms,
they need not identify with the substance of the claims made by the
formerly unrepresented; instead, they can argue that some concept
of procedural justice requires that the unrepresented have an oppor-
tunity to present their position forcefully to decisionmakers. When so
defended, public interest law is a misleading phrase: Advancement
of the public interest does not necessarily depend upon substantive
victories of the unrepresented but instead from participation of weak
minorities or diffuse majorities in the competition of the adversary or
political processes. The public interest presumably emerges from the
conflicting pressures of these processes.
To other supporters of public interest law, the broad goal of "rep-
resenting the unrepresented" is merely an uncontroversial gloss for
more substantive values. The purpose of providing legal resources for
formerly unrepresented consumers or environmentalists is to secure
decent products or to promote clean air. Blacks or Puerto Ricans
need lawyers because racial equality is an unalloyed good. Assertion
of such substantive values presupposes a balancing of complex inter-
7. While the concepts of the "public interest," "diffuse majority" and "weak mi-
nority" raise obvious conceptual difficulties, see note 18 infra, public interest lawyers
have often failed to carry their justification for public interest law much beyond the
generalizations outlined above. During the last ten years, when public interest law in
the diffuse majority sense has grown markedly, little attention has been paid to the
refinement of these concepts; instead, efforts have been devoted to garnering money
from sources generally sympathetic to the broad concept of public interest law and
to showing that public interest law works in practice.
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ests; public interest lawyers who advance substantive rationales are
presumably prepared to argue that the particular value they espouse
should prevail under some conception of justice or equality, regard-
less of the impact on other values. 8 But appropriating the phrase
public interest for such activities, while a candid declaration of value,
is nonetheless controversial. Obviously, other individuals or groups
who are adversely affected by the goals the public interest lawyers
are promoting (e.g., "clean air, .... racial equality") will challenge the
claim that the environmentalists or integrationists have exclusive power
to descry the public welfare. Given the political controversy that is
certain to arise when substantive values are aggressively asserted as
being in the public interest, the procedural justification for public
interest law has always been the more conservative one: It fits more
easily into the norms of our political and legal culture.
B.
Since the existence of a subsidy to represent the unrepresented
means that public interest lawyers must defend their efforts to the
subsidizer, articulating justifications for public interest law bears an
obvious relation to securing funding for such legal activities. At pres-
ent, there are three main sources of income for public interest lawyers.
1. The public interest law market. In order to avoid justifying their
legal efforts to third party subsidizers, a small number of public inter-
est lawyers have attempted to explore the possibilities of surviving
in an ill-defined market for public interest lawY Such lawyers either
engage in a "pure" public interest practice-taking reduced fees from
previously unrepresented clients-or in a mixed public interest/private
practice-by using regular fees from private clients to finance public
interest cases brought on behalf of individuals or groups otherwise
unable to obtain legal counsel.10 In a sense, these market public
8. Of course, when arguing from an express legislative command, public interest
lawyers can maintain that they are merely seeking to implement the will of Congress,
which has already balanced competing concerns. However, since Congress often dele-
gates enormous power to administrative agencies with vague legislative history as a
backdrop, the development of substantive statutory standards may be left to the agen-
cies and to the courts. See pp. 229-31.
9. See, e.g., Berlin, Roisman S. Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 675
(1970).
10. Large commercial firms also engage in what might be termed a "mixed public
interest/private" practice, since many of the more prestigious ones devote a certain
amount of their time to public interest cases on a pro bono basis. As a definitional
matter, a firm might be considered a public interest law firm when it spends more
than 25 percent of its time on public interest practice. Even the most public-spirited
The Yale Law Journal
interest lawyers are subsidizing their own legal efforts, since they are
often foregoing much greater economic gain to represent formerly
unrepresented clients. A second type of market public interest lawyer
is beginning to pioneer in group legal services; he or she provides
services to individuals or groups on a high volume, reduced fee basis.
The emphasis of the "group legal public interest" lawyers is often on
service efforts, not on law reform litigation or policy formulation."
2. Public subsidies. A number of lawyers have, of course, been work-
ing as public interest attorneys pursuant to government-funded Neigh-
borhood Legal Services. This program in the civil area, like funding
for the Criminal Justice Act or public defender services on the crimi-
nal side, constitutes a direct public subsidy for lawyers representing
the previously unrepresented. Such a subsidy is justified on procedural
due process grounds.12 The award of attorney's fees, under either a
common fund or private attorney general theory, represents another
form of public support for public interest law, but one that is, of
course, available only after a substantive victory.13
3. Private subsidies. Direct private subsidies have doubtless provided
most of the funds for those public interest firms engaged in major
law reform efforts. The dominant form of direct private subsidy is
foundation funding.14 Other types of private subsidies include: mem-
bership/subscription support; 15 large individual donors; public in-
private firm rarely claims that it spends more than 15 percent of its time on pro
bono matters.
Another definitional problem arises over the concept of "reduced fees from pre-
viously unrepresented" clients. If the standard fee for a private, corporate lawyer is
$100 per hour, is the lawyer who represents the Sierra Club at $30 an hour a "public
interest" lawyer, but the attorney for a national union who works at $70 an hour
a "private" one? How does one know that a lawyer who takes a "reduced fee" could,
in other circumstances, command a higher (i.e., more normal) one?
11. See generally B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 225-91
(1970).
12. For example, the recently passed Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No.
93-355, § 1001(1) (July 25, 1974), includes in its declaration of purpose the finding
that "there is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation
for individuals who seek redress of grievances."
13. See, e.g., Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974). With respect to attorney fee awards, the phrase
"public subsidy" is used loosely; recovery of fees pursuant to court order may lie
against both governmental units and private parties.
14. The list of foundations which have contributed to public interest law efforts
includes: Carnegie, Clark, Field, Ford, New World, Rockefeller Brothers, Rockefeller
Family and Stern Family. The largest contributor to public interest law has been the
Ford Foundation. See FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 6; Foster, Playing it Safe on $11
Million a Year, JURIs DoCroR, June 1973, at 9.
15. Such diverse public interest law efforts as the American Civil Liberties Union,
Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, Inc., and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
receive substantial proportions of their annual income from funds donated by indi-
vidual members or subscribers. The NRDC, for example, has hired a full-time fundraiser
to deal with membership and other financial problems.
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terest research groups;'16 and the pro bono efforts of the bar, either
through individual activities of firm members, branch offices or pub-
lic interest firms sponsored by local bar associations.1" The justifica-
tions for such efforts are as diverse as the subsidizers. But it is prob-
ably fair to generalize that most public interest lawyers formally
defend their work to their donors on procedural grounds, although
strong substantive preferences (if not full-blown theoretical defenses)
for the values being defended lurk in the background of the lawyers'
minds (and often in the minds of the donors as well).
C.
If the defining goal of the public interest law movement is to rep-
resent the unrepresented, then the goal of public interest law finance
might be expressed as follows: provision of an adequate number of
politically independent public interest lawyers who are economically
self-sufficient. But if stating these basic goals is easy, defining their
operative terms is extraordinarily difficult. The concept of public
interest law raises a host of theoretical questions. What does "unrep-
resented" mean? When is a minority "weak" or a majority interest
"diffuse"? What is "procedural equality"? How does one demonstrate
the substantive validity of a value advanced by public interest law-
yers?' 8 Similarly, what does the concept of an "adequate number of
public interest lawyers" entail?19 And, if economic self-sufficiency in-
volves having money for starting up, for sustained operations, for
complex as well as simple litigation and for attracting quality lawyers,
16. The public interest research group (PIRG) is Ralph Nader's idea. In essence,
the PIRG's are financed by a checkoff system, in which many students in various
colleges or university systems contribute a small amount of their tuition to public
interest law firms that are overseen by students and faculty. See generally R. NADER
& D. Ross, ACTION FOR CHANGE: A STUDENT'S MANUAL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZING
(1971).
17. For an excellent, if somewhat dated, summary of public interest efforts of private
law firms and the organized bar, see R. MARKS, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC AND PRO-
rESSIONAL REspoNSImLIT" (1972). A newsletter, Pro Bono Report, is published by the
American Bar Association's Special Committee on Public Interest Practice; it contains
current information on public interest activities by both public interest and private firms.
18. Many of the normative debates about public interest law are, of course, merely
the reflections of the controversy between "pluralist" economists and political scientists
and their critics over whether the competition between organized interests yields the
public good, how unorganized interests may be brought into competitive parity, and
whether certain critical societal needs will be ignored in any conflict, however equal.
See Note, supra note 1, at 1070 n.3. With a little imagination, one can quickly push
beyond the confines of the pluralist debate into the whole realm of normative and
descriptive history and argumentation in trying to analyze the public interest concept.
19. For an attempt to analyze the demand for and cost of legal services, see B.
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 11, at 1-81.
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how much money is needed to achieve such self-sufficiency? Or, if
"independence" means the ability to represent controversial clients-
to be "free" from "political" constraints-how can public interest
lawyers who receive public monies be both accountable and inde-
pendent?
These questions and the many others that lie behind them are not
just of academic interest. To be sure, private donors can give indi-
vidual answers to them and dole out all the money, consistent with
the tax laws, that they wish. But, as will be noted below, if the re-
sources devoted to public interest law are to expand and the sources
of income are to be more broadly based, then the justification must
be more carefully detailed in order to persuade new money (that may
be neither intuitively sympathetic with public interest law nor un-
alterably opposed to achievement of its goals) to participate in its
development.
Such broadening of financial support for public interest law is al-
most surely necessary if the movement is even to begin to achieve
its objectives. For although it is difficult (and beyond the scope of
this review) to establish a precise conceptual framework for assessing
whether the goals of public interest law and public interest law fi-
nance are being achieved, it is certainly possible to make the common
sense observation, as the President of the American Bar Association
has recently done,20 that there is still an enormous unmet need for
providing quality legal representation to citizens and groups who do
not have it.
It is also possible to give an impressionistic overview of the limits
of current sources of income for public interest lawyers. The conclu-
sion of such an overview is that none of the current sources of fi-
nancial support are secure, and an expanded practice of law in the
public interest is not certain, or even likely, to occur.
Lawyers trying to exist independently in a public interest law
market still face numerous problems. These include: lack of startup
20. In calling for support by the organized bar of public interest law firms, Chesterfield
Smith noted:
While activity on behalf of the indigent is laudable and must continue, it is now
apparent that this concern is only one part of the total obligation of the legal
profession to ensure that each and every segment of society is adequately represented.
If this is so, it is vital to the continued viability of the adversary system that
remedial action be instituted in behalf of the unrepresented. There are both in-
dividuals and groups who, for practical purposes, are barred from the courts and
from legal processes generally because they lack sufficient commitment and re-
sources to support litigation on the same scale as their adversaries. Environmental
and consumer concerns are two immediate and obvious examples.
Smith, President's Page, 60 A.B.A.J. 641 (1974).
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funds; limited number of public interest clients who can afford to
pay even at reduced fee rates; very ill-defined and risky markets; in-
ability to undertake long and complicated litigation because of ex-
treme cash flow problems; the need to take paying cases, causing cases
that are more important from a policy perspective to be ignored; and
economic pressures that prevent systematic development of new areas
of law. In fact, due, among other things, to cash flow problems and
the difficulties in finding clients who can pay on a reduced fee basis,
it is hard to imagine this form of public interest law growing sig-
nificantly without other forms of subsidy, such as attorney's fee awards.
Similarly, many of the new group legal services efforts are in a very
uncertain period because basic statistical information on the needs of
different kinds of groups does not yet exist; this information is neces-
sary not only for the survival of this type of practice, but also for
development of significant law reform components within them.
The problem with using public subsidies, through government
programs, to support independent public interest law is, of course, ex-
pressed in a single word: politics. The problems involved in the recent
passage of the Legal Services Corporation Act need not be recounted
here,21 but they certainly dampen any optimism about immediately
establishing any new legal assistance programs that directly tap the
national treasury for public interest law support. Moreover, awards
of attorney's fees under private attorney general theory, while a
promising development, are unlikely to be a total solution to the
problem of financing public interest law activity. For example, under
current Internal Revenue Service guidelines, certain types of public
interest firms cannot accept attorney's fees. 22 In addition, fees cannot
generally be obtained from the federal government under present
law. 23 The question of what is a reasonable fee, an issue that is critical
21. See, e.g., Comment, The Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing Political In-
terference, 81 YALE L.J. 231 (1971).
22. IRS Guideline No. 2 does not allow public interest firms to accept fees ex-
cept with the approval of the IRS. Hearings, supra note 6, at 12. Negotiations are cur-
rently underway between Public Advocates, a Ford-funded public interest firm, and
the IRS over the circumstances in which Public Advocates may accept fees either paid
by clients or won in the firm's role as private attorney general.
23. It has generally been thought that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) acts as a bar to re-
covery of attorney's fees in actions against the federal government, Wilderness Society v.
Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), although there are many express statutory ex-
ceptions to this command. An attempt by public interest lawyers to have the statute
construed differently was recently rebuffed at the appellate level, though certiorari is
now being sought. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3173 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1974) (No. 342).
Moreover the Supreme Court's recent decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974),
raises the question of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars recovery of attorney's fees
against the states.
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to any calculus of public interest law's economic survival, is unsettled,
to say the least.2 4 And fees are usually not awarded to lawyers making
a substantial contribution in proceedings before administrative agen-
cies or for expert testimony produced by public interest lawyers, even
though both areas are vital to the sophisticated practice of public
interest law.2 5 Furthermore, the growth of federal class actions, upon
which the common fund theory may depend, has been restricted by
recent Supreme Court decisions.
26
Finally, each type of direct private subsidy presents problems if
one seeks to rely on any of them for the provision of an adequate
number of self-sufficient public interest lawyers. Foundation funding
has been an important source, especially in the last five years, but
the perennial question remains27-how long will the major founda-
tions contribute substantially to the public interest law field?28 Sub-
scription income is also problematical for a variety of reasons: It is
difficult for organizations to establish stable membership bases, direct
mail costs are rising rapidly, and net revenues for some groups em-
24. See Comment, supra note 13, at 702-05. The reasonableness of the fee is a key
variable, of course, in any plans for a public interest firm to support itself without
other forms of subsidy. Other variables in the calculus which determines how effective
attorney fee awards will be in financing a public interest law firm are: total salaries of
lawyers, relation of total salaries to overhead, the number of billable hours per at-
torney, the number of cases the firm wins, the total amount recovered through court
awarded fees, and the average recovery per lawyer-hour worked in a winning cause.
A hypothetical example will illustrate the relationship of the xariables. Assume an
eight-person firm, with each lawyer earning $25,000. Assume also that each lawyer
accounts for $25,000 of overhead. The firm's annual budget is thus $400,000. Assume
further that each lawyer works 1600 billable hours per year (approximately 30 per
week), that each lawyer wins half his or her cases, that half the cases account for
half the hours, and that the average recovery for those hours worked is S50. Given
this set of facts, the firm's annual income would be $320,000, or $80,000 less than
expenses (800 hours X $50 X eight lawyers = $320,000). Moreover, such an analysis does
not take into account two other critical economic problems: startup costs and cash
flow. The latter factor is important because the receipt of fees often takes place long
after the court victory.
25. In a case currently pending before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiffs
are seeking attorney's fees for their contribution to an administrative proceeding.
Turner v. Federal Communications Comm'n, Civil No. 74-1298 (D.C. Cir., filed Feb.
28, 1974). This case is one of the first to raise this issue.
26. For example, in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), the Su-
preme Court held that in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions founded on diversity jurisdiction
every member of the plaintiff class must meet the jurisdictional amount in controversy
requirement of $10,000. And in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974),
the court ruled that individual notice must be given to all identifiable class members
in a class action brought pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See also Dawson, Lawyers
and Involuntary Clients: Attorneys Fees From Funds, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1597 (1974).
27. Note, supra note 1, at 1111-15.
28. "Among the unresolved questions is whether . . . [public interest firms] will
remain heavily dependent on financial support from private foundations, or whether
they can broaden their financial support and thus guarantee their independence."
FoRD FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 39. Budget reductions are currently under con-
sideration at the Ford Foundation, which could affect funding in this area. See N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
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ploying this method have been rising more slowly than anticipated.29
Large individual donors, it need hardly be said, are difficult to find.
The public interest research groups (PIRG's) are a hopeful develop-
ment, but they have not as yet demonstrated continuity and staying
power. And, while individual law firms are hampered from under-
taking public interest efforts due to conflicts of interest, the organized
bar has not yet provided enough leadership in developing public
interest law.30
II
After reviewing American reform from the 1890's to the present,
Lazarus concludes that "public-interest law is now the last best hope
to vindicate the populist ideal."31 Unfortunately, The Genteel Popu-
lists is a tour de force that fails. It does not take the general, diffuse
majority justification for public interest law much beyond the com-
monplace (though accurate) observation that implementation of regu-
latory legislation is sometimes frustrated by concentrated corporate
(and other) interests. Accordingly, it is best read as a partial summary
of the broad, promotional thinking which has accompanied the recent
emergence of public interest law as a "most interesting example of
social experimentation," 32 rather than as a presentation of the new
ideas regarding both the rationale and financing of public interest
law which must emerge if it is to become an enduring and significant
feature of the legal landscape.
To telescope Lazarus's argument, the populist ideal derives its ani-
mus from a "suspicion of corporate power, or more precisely, suspicion
of corporate subversion of government power."33 As economic forces
became increasingly concentrated, populists historically sought to cabin
the unbridled power of "special interests" and to " 'redress the balance
of social power' " in favor of the public.3 4 To accomplish this, populist
reformers have advanced two broad strategies: direct democratic con-
trol over institutions with power (the Progressives) or use of govern-
ment and its bureaucracies to regulate the excesses of vested interests
(the New Deal).
29. This has been the experience of the Natural Resources Defense Council. In-
terview with Thomas Stoel, NRDC staff attorney, Sept. 30, 1974, in Washington, D.C.
30. As a recent American Bar Foundation study concluded: "The organized bar
* has not played a central part in either the overall response or in the overall
address of the profession to questions of professional responsibility to the public." R.
MARKS, supra note 17.
31. P. 274.
32. Levi, Foreword to FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 8.
33. P. 2.
34. P. 20.
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But, according to Lazarus, these strategies have not worked: Life
is too complicated for direct democratic control, and efforts at gov-
ernment regulation are inevitably captured by the very interests that
government seeks to regulate. Pluralist political theorists, the arch-
enemies of the populists, have hoped that the public interest will
emerge from the competition between organized interest groups under
the government's moderating hand. But the populist critics of plural-
ism, and Lazarus apparently counts himself as one,35 note that some
interests worthy of protection are not organized and that organized
interests do not always compete with each other but instead stake out
their own areas of concern and manipulate government efforts to
intrude in those special precincts. Moreover, some programs of neo-
populists like Ralph Nader will only perpetuate the mistakes of the
past: By using public relations techniques, which Lazarus terms the
"pageant of reform,"36 Nader urges adoption of "grand designs '' 37
like the Consumer Protection Agency or federal incorporation, pro-
grams that promise much more than they can deliver. Thus there is
the danger of "'fake reform' " which will only result in further en-
trenchment of "special interests" as they dominate new government
agencies. Lazarus maintains that the new populists must "adopt a
vision that is at once strategically more modest and philosophically
more conservative." 39 Central to such a vision is the public interest
law firm, advocating the general welfare in courts of law administered
by judges who will be more immune from improper political pres-
sures than agency administrators and who will, with the help of
counsel, vindicate the public interest in at least some instances.
40
Public interest law holds out the promise of "making corporate and
bureaucratic power accountable."1
4
The basic failing of The Genteel Populists is that it never comes
to grips with the fundamental problem it is analyzing: the role of
government intervention in the economy to secure the public inter-
est. Granted, this is as complex a problem as there is; but given the
scope and ambition of Lazarus's effort one could expect that he would
35. Lazarus briefly summarizes and agrees with the writings of the antipluralist
critics (pp. 167-89), including the following: H. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN
PLURALISM (1961); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE
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have a coherent position-or at least a perspective-on the issue. This,
however, is not the case. Lazarus is neither a violent de-regulator nor
a closet socialist. He has no strong views on the role of the antitrust
laws or antitrust enforcement. 42 At times, he does doubt, along with
many others, whether agencies established to structure whole indus-
tries and thereafter direct their course in the public interest will
succeed in their task of "offensive regulation.14 3 Yet at other times
he suggests that the enterprise is a worthwhile one if carried out by
the courts.44 He does think that agencies with "defensive," policing
functions-e.g., banning or labeling of unsafe products-can be effec-
tive. But the distinction between the types of reform is presented as
a brief afterthought. In short, Lazarus favors a mixed economy with
some form of regulation, but because he leaves the nature of regu-
lation so vaguely adumbrated, his position is hardly an illuminating
or novel one.
The spareness of theory is unfortunately matched by an absence
of facts. Although this is a book about reform, social and economic
ills are rarely described in any detail. We are not given many facts
about how particular industries are structured, what their failings
are, how citizens are harmed, how such failings and harms are meas-
ured. Although the book has its share of anecdotes, too much of The
Genteel Populists takes place in a social and economic vacuum, a
factor which only compounds the fuzziness resulting from the lack of
theoretical focus. Lazarus does emphasize again and again the political
fact that industry lobbyists hover about legislators and agency per-
sonnel, trying to stage-manage decisions.45 But this observation, too,
is hardly a novel one.
40
Given these general problems, it is not surprising that Lazarus's
account of public interest law lacks sharpness. For example, there is
confusion about what it means to say that public interest lawyers
may be able to make corporate power, or other organized interests,
"accountable." "Accountable," it must obviously be asked, in what
sense? Lazarus himself acknowledges that public interest law is a
42. See pp. 215-18.
43. Pp. 222-25. Lazarus opposes broad cartelization of certain industries through regu-
lation, pp. 54-55, though he does not offer much by way of analysis and explanation:
What, for example, would be the effects of greater competition on the airline in-
dustry? See note 50 infra.
44. Pp. 230-34.
45. See, e.g., pp. 104-05.
46. It has, of course, been a salient theme of nearly all the studies of federal agen-
cies by Ralph Nader and his associates. See, e.g., J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST:
RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (1970).
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fairly conservative reform technique, proceeding mainly through the
courts. Does Lazarus then propose that a hardy band of public interest
lawyers and a handful of innovative judges are going to deal by them-
selves with the dominant economic issues of the day implicating busi-
ness, labor, and government: inflation, manpower policies, control of
technology, resource allocation, environmental controls, economic con-
centration, quality of consumer goods, and worker safety? Of course
not, since litigation is a time-consuming, costly technique that often
has a limited impact on major policy decisions. But what then is the
public interest lawyer's role with respect to those questions? We are
not told, since basic economic issues are not analyzed in any depth.
A related problem is Lazarus's failure to analyze the concept of the
public interest. At times he uses the phrase in the procedural sense
to mean increased access to decisionmakers of heretofore unrepresent-
ed interests. In so doing, he is merely adopting a form of pluralist
proceduralism which he criticizes elsewhere.47 At other times, he sug-
gests that judges, following the urgings of public interest lawyers,
should give more substantive content to "populist platitudes written
into laws . . . . ,,With respect to the Federal Aviation Act, for ex-
ample, Lazarus contends that the courts "must insist that 'the public
interest' should be construed as 'the consumer interest,' or that terms
like 'economical' or 'efficient' be given meaningful content and be
applied vigorously by the agency to evaluate the operations of regu-
lated interests. '49 That sounds like a nice idea, but it clearly is not
as easy to do as it sounds. Again, Lazarus does not give us enough
substance to demonstrate (or even suggest) how it can and should be
done if neither the statutory language nor the legislative history offer
much guidance. 50 Moreover, in light of Lazarus's hope that public
interest lawyers will induce judges to pour content into vague sub-
stantive standards embodied in acts of Congress, it seems illogical for
him to criticize Nader's efforts to use the pageant of reform as a
catalyst for new national legislative efforts. The tools which he urges
47. Compare pp. 154-57 (environmental advocates only represent "a public interest")
[emphasis in original], with pp. 167-89.
48. P. 231.
49. Id.
50. What is the consumer interest? Would airlines still be required to maintain un-
profitable routes? Would more competition result in the danger of cost-cutting on
safety measures with the increased need for more federal regulation to prevent vio-
lations of safety rules? There is so little analysis of the airline industry and the role
of the Civil Aeronautics Board that Lazarus fails to make out a convincing case to the
intelligent, but uninformed layman for public interest law intervention (although there
is doubtless one to be made).
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public interest lawyers to use come from "grand design" legislation
currently on the books; and the arts of publicity practiced by people
like Nader and John Gardner may shape the political climate, making
it easier for judges to decide cases under such laws against "special
interests."51
Finally, while recognizing that methods of financing public interest
law must be found,52 Lazarus offers little analysis of this problem
except to endorse, quite properly, an expansion of attorney's fee awards
under either a common fund or private attorney general theory. Oddly
enough, given his experience as law clerk to Nicholas Johnson at the
Federal Communications Commission, he does not discuss the various
lacunae in attorney's fee law which have a substantial limiting effect
on public interest practice before federal courts and administrative
agencies. Furthermore, despite his endorsement of public interest law,
his recognition of the central importance of funding for such practice,
and his concern with the ideology of reformist movements, Lazarus
neither explores other sources of income for public interest lawyers
nor asks how public interest justifications might affect the availability
of money.
The Genteel Populists is best when Lazarus, who is obviously a
creative activist and writes with a lively style, sketches scenes from
his own experience as clerk to Nicholas Johnson and as general coun-
sel of New York City's consumer protection agency. When painting
with a broad theoretical and historical brush, he is weakest, and given
the large themes Lazarus has set for himself, such strokes fill up much
of his book. In order to make the points which he cares about-the
influence of corporations on government regulation, the problems
with neopopulist proposals, the role of the public interest lawyers-
Lazarus would have ,produced a more compelling book if he had
treated in greater detail the role of a public interest firm concerned
with a particular industry 3 or had developed more fully a much
needed account and critique of Ralph Nader's conception of public
51. Lazarus broadly criticizes Nader's plan for federal incorporation on the usual
ground that any agency which administers the law will become captive of corporate
interests. Pp. 207-15. But he does not examine the question with any care; neither
does he clearly explain the various purposes federal incorporation might serve nor
discuss whether some of those purposes might be achieved by other means; cf. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
52. P. 230.
53. For example, Lazarus, drawing on his own experience at the FCC, might have
more carefully evaluated the efforts of an energetic public interest law firm, the
Citizens' Communication Center, to intervene in the regulatory processes affecting the
broadcasting industry.
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interest reform.54 In order to avoid repeating the truisms of public
interest thought, he would have done well to heed his own advice
and been more conservative in his aims and less concerned about try-
ing to describe the whole pageant of reform in 20th century America.
III
If Lazarus's account provides little guidance for the future of public
interest law, what, then, are the potential mechanisms for securing
the financing of the public interest practice? In the public interest
law market, the group legal services concept, as noted, is the most
promising, although the problems involved in establishing group legal
services for certain kinds of interests55 or in creating law reform com-
ponents in existing organizations have barely been explored.
With respect to public subsidies, there are several possibilities.
Agencies could establish their own public interest counsel, who would
represent the interests of citizens rather than those of the agencies.50
National legislation on attorney's fees could be developed, based on
either the common fund theory or the private attorney general the-
ory.57 Alternatively, national legislation involving more direct subsi-
dies to public interest lawyers, administered either by a quasi-inde-
pendent board of governors of a public trust fund or through a judicare
mechanism, could be urged.58
So too, there are a variety of possibilities for increasing funds from
private donors. A Fund for Public Interest Law could be established
through large grants from a number of foundations. Ideally, founda-
tions already active in the field, in combination with other charitable
organizations, could establish a corpus which would yield income
54. While both critical and admiring of Nader, Lazarus never draws together the
various threads of his anal)sis to give a comprehensive view of the work of the most
well-known public interest lawyer. Nader has used a wide variety of reforming tech-
niques: from publicity and lobbying to litigation and local organizing. While favoring
some "grand designs," as Lazarus notes, Nader is also concerned with questions of de-
regulation. A more complete assessment of his ideas, methods and successes would
have offered some concrete lessons for the future of public interest law.
55. How, for example, would environmental interests get represented through a group
legal services mechanism?
56. See, e.g., Stein, Public Counsel and the Federal Railroad Reorganization, AL-
TERNATIvEs, Aug. 1974, at 6 (attempt to create an office of public counsel in the In-
terstate Commerce Commission to facilitate representation of citizen interests in agency
proceedings under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973).
57. Hearings were held last year to consider such legislation, Hearings on the Effect
of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation Before the Subcomm. on Repre-
sentation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
58. See, e.g., S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE: PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS AND POOR PEOPLE
(1974).
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either for annual funding of public interest law firms or for firm
startup costs. A separate board of trustees and staff would be formed
to manage and allocate the Fund. Alternatively, a similar fund, fueled
by donations from bar associations or individual firms or firm mem-
bers, could be set up at a local, state or national level. Bar association
experiments with the establishment of local public interest firms could
also be expanded.50 Compulsory tithing could be the fundraising
mechanism for such bar initiatives.6 0
In addition to the foundations, the two largest future sources of
income, at least for major public interest litigation and policy for-
mation, are the private bar and the public treasury. But the need for
sophisticated justifications for public interest law arises forcefully
when either the bar or Congress (or state legislatures) are the targets
of financial solicitation for public interest law. Obviously, as subsi-
dizers become more political-composed of persons with a range of
ideological views and subject to a broader range of interest group
pressures-the need for making a persuasive justification that will
reconcile diverse objections to public interest practice becomes cor-
respondingly greater. The procedural justification has clear appeal in
this respect. But whether the prospective public interest institution
is to protect a weak minority or a diffuse majority interest, vital sub-
stantive questions of who represents the interest, who decides who is
representative, and what principles determine the allocation of money
both between and within unrepresented interests will pose great dif-
ficulties for any subsidy planner. Beyond the conceptual problem of
identifying legitimate representatives for the unrepresented, the pol-
itics of the subsidy may well be difficult since the abstract cry of
procedural fairness cannot hide the reality that assertions of right-
albeit in the name of the adversary process-have a significant impact,
in terms of time, money and possible result, on other established
groups or interests.' Moreover, basic economic facts should be de-
veloped about the need for public interest lawyers in various fields
59. Bar associations in Boston and Beverly Hills have allocated a portion of dues
to creation of public interest law firms. Smith, supra note 20.
60. See, e.g., Tucker, Pro Bono Publico or Pro Bono Organized Bar?, 60 A.B.A.J.
916 (1974) (suggesting that the bar tithe itself or provide equivalent service, enforced
by sanctions and disciplinary procedures, to meet its public interest obligation).
61. Specific justifications, e.g., protection of consumer or environmental or health
care interests, are doubtless easier to develop than more general justifications. But if
a larger number of specific justifications are offered to more political subsidizers, then
other specific interests may be ignored in any resulting subsidized public interest
institution.
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and about how individual public interest firms subsist. These facts
are necessary to buttress any justification of public interest practice.
It is an open question, just as it was four years ago,0 2 whether
procedural or substantive justifications can be devised that will satisfy
political, conceptual and factual needs and yield greater income for
public interest law. But there can be little doubt that if public
interest law is to move beyond the promotional stage and achieve
a measure of institutional and financial permanence through new,
expanded economic support, more sophisticated justifications for pub-
lic interest law practice and more precise factual material on its
economics must be developed. And since public interest lawyers are
so preoccupied with litigation and other day-to-day tasks, such think-
ing should probably come from an institution created for the specific
purpose of devising new methods of public interest law finance. The
Genteel Populists clearly demonstrates the need for such analysis.
62. "[T]hc practice of public interest law, if it is to survive at all, will have to
seek new forms and sources of financing." Note, supra note 1, at 1148.




Alexander Bickel was the first law professor many of us ever en-
countered, that distant first morning of law school in Constitutional
Law I. We had heard of him, of course: the man who defended the
Times in the Pentagon Papers case, who wrote so trenchantly for
The New Republic, who stumped for Bobby Kennedy. These were
exciting "liberal" credentials; perhaps we expected to have our fondest
predispositions reinforced-many of us being convinced, in those in-
nocent days, that if an action were wrong, it must somehow be
unconstitutional.
We were in for a surprise, a brisk cold shower in that early morning
of our law careers-stimulating, good for our intellectual health. He
asked probing questions about the role of courts in a democratic so-
ciety. He reminded us that federal judges were not inevitably "little
Earl Warrens in black robes" (as he put it once, making gentle fun
of our eagerness). He inspired us with a vision of the law as the highest
and most careful application of our powers of reason. If we did not
all emerge in complete agreement with him-little Alexander Bickels
in blue jeans-we did come away with a deeper and more subtle sense
of what is at stake when a court exercises its ultimate powers of con-
stitutional interpretation-a most important lesson. We are richer for
that experience; students who follow are now so much deprived.
The Editors dedicate this issue to the memory of Professor Bickel.
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